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THE LITIGATION-ARBITRATION

DICHOTOMY

MEETS THE CLASS ACTION
Richard A. Nagareda*
INTRODUCTION

Observers typically cast litigation and arbitration in contrast to
one another. Litigation takes place under off-the-rack rules prescribed by public law-for the federal courts, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. By contrast, arbitration is a creature of the private
law of contracts and part of the larger realm of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR). The term "alternative" highlights the contrast with
litigation. One prominent concern in recent years posits that ADR
mechanisms have given rise to a troubling body of "contract procedure"1 that shunts off to an opaque, privatized forum many kinds of
civil disputes that previously would have formed the grist for the open,
public process of litigation. On this account, litigation and arbitration
© 2011 Richard A. Nagareda. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation
to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor and Director, Cecil D. Branstetter Litigation & Dispute Resolution
Program, Vanderbilt University Law School. Christopher Drahozal, Andrew Gould,
Samuel Issacharoff, Erin O'Hara, Peter Rutledge, and Suzanna Sherry provided
insightful comments on earlier drafts. Lauren Fromme provided helpful research
assistance.
At the district court level, I served as an expert witness in support of AT&T
Mobility LLP's motion to compel arbitration in one of the cases discussed herein:
Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255 (S.D. Cal.
Aug. 11, 2008), affd sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.
2009), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322
(2010). The analysis presented in this Article in light of subsequent developmentsparticularly, the Supreme Court's decisions in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010)-stands as my independent assessment as a
commentator, not necessarily the position of any interested party in Concepcion.
1 SeeJudith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 593, 598-600
(2005).
1o69

1070

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 86:3

comprise dichotomous, even rivalrous, regimes for the resolution of
civil claims.
Two decisions from the October 2009 Term of the Supreme
2
Court-Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.
in the context of litigation and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.3 in the setting of arbitration-frame a need for more systematic dialogue across the two domains. The engine behind the
need for dialogue stems from one of the most distinctive and controversial features of the U.S. civil justice landscape: the possibility of procedural aggregation through the mechanism of a class action or its
ADR counterpart, class arbitration. Indeed, the atypical nature of
many features of U.S. civil litigation from a comparative standpointthe U.S.-style class action included-sheds light on the Court's arbitration jurisprudence in ways not yet fully appreciated.
At their cores, both Shady Grove and Stolt-Nielsen turn crucially
upon characterization of the essential nature of the class mechanism.
Is it merely a super-sized form of joinder (which permits multiple
plaintiffs to combine in a single lawsuit) 4 or is it more transformative
in nature? 5 At first glance, one might have expected the Court to
arrive at a similar view of class treatment across the two decisions.
That, however, is not so. The affinity between the questions in the two
cases and the divergent answers that the Court provides accentuate
the pressure on the litigation-arbitration dichotomy.
In Shady Grove, the Court confronted a question that first-year
Civil Procedure students would find familiar. In section 901 (b) of its
Civil Practice Law and Rules, the New York state legislature specifies
that an action to recover statutory damages-in Shady Grove, "statutory
interest penalties" for overdue payments of insurance benefits6-"may
not be maintained as a class action" unless the law that provides for
such damages "specifically authorizes" the class format.7 Insofar as
legislative materials reveal, the notion behind section 901(b) is to
2 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
3 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
4 See FED. R. Ctv. P. 20(a) ("Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: (A)
they assert any right to reliefjointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the

action.").
5 For a prescient early framing of this question, see Diane Wood Hutchinson,
Class Actions: Joinderor RepresentationalDevice?, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 459.
6 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 140 (2d
Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
7 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006).
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avoid remedial "overkill" 8-the addition of class treatment to a remedy already designed to "provide[ ] an aggrieved party with a sufficient economic incentive to pursue a claim," so as to generate a
whopping level of potential liability in the aggregate.9 By the terms of
section 901(b), the proposed class action in Shady Grove clearly could
not have been maintained in New York state court. The question for
the Court, however, was whether section 901 (b) categorically bars the
maintenance of a class action in federal court on the basis of diversity
of citizenship.10 By a 5-4 vote, the Court answered "no."' I
The Court holds that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exclusively governs the conditions under which a class action
"may be maintained" 12 in federal court. Specifically, Rule 23 displaces
New York section 901 (b) to the contrary by the terms of the federal
Rules Enabling Act, as long as Rule 23 itself is proper under that statute. 13 The Rules Enabling Act famously authorizes the Supreme
Court "to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure" for the
federal courts, subject to the caveat that "[s]uch rules shall not
14
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."
The prospect of a class action in a case like Shady Grove is far from
a mere technical matter. The Court's holding positions class counsel
to "attempt to transform a $500 [individual] case into a $5,000,000
award" on a class basis. 15 The Court acknowledges this dramatic realworld effect, but the Court nonetheless concludes that Rule 23 does
not "enlarge" substantive rights in contravention of the Rules Enabling Act. 16
8 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Attachment
to Letter from G. Perkinson, N.Y. State Council of Retail Merchs., Inc., to J. Gribetz,
Exec. Chamber (June 4, 1975) (Legislative Report), Bill Jacket, L. 1975, ch. 207).
9 Id. (quoting Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 2007)).
10 The procedural posture in which Shady Grove reached the Supreme Court-on
a grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss on the pleadings, rather than a denial of
a motion for class certification-cast the question concerning New York section
901(b) in a stark, categorical form. As a result, the Court did not have occasion to
discuss specifically the role, if any, that section 901(b) might play as a discretionary
matter in a federal court's class certification analysis under Rule 23. See infra Part
I.A.2.
11 See Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1438.
12 See FFD. R. Cwv. P. 23(b).
13 See Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1442; id. at 1456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
14 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b) (2006). The Act goes on to displace "[a]ll laws in
conflict with such rules" of practice and procedure for the federal courts. Id.
§ 2072(b).
15 See Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Writing for a four-member plurality, Justice Scalia remarks that
Rule 23, "no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a species),
merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties
at once.1' 7 On this view, "[t]he likelihood that some (even many)
plaintiffs will be induced to sue by the availability of a class action is
just the sort of 'incidental effec [t]' we have long held does not violate
[the Rules Enabling Act]."18 Even while diverging from the plurality
at points, the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens takes the same
view of the class action. For Justice Stevens, "the class vehicle may
have a greater practical effect on who brings lawsuits than do low filing fees, but that does not transform" the class action into something
like a state law cap on damages available in any civil action-something that might present a closer case under the Rules Enabling Act
caveat. 19
With Shady Grove on the books, one might have expected the
same view of class treatment to obtain less than a month later in StoltNielsen. Yet the enabling of claiming that the Shady Grove Court deems
a nontransformative, incidental effect with no bearing on substantive
rights suddenly becomes something different in kind for the Stolt-Nielsen Court. Writing there in the context of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),20 the Court invokes the enabling of claiming occasioned by
class treatment as the decisive ground to explain why arbitrators may
not infer from contractual silence in an arbitration clause that a class21
wide format is permissible.
Writing for a five-Justice majority in Stolt-Nielsen, Justice Alito
acknowledges that "procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for the
judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide." 22 But the Stolt-Nielsen Court
then proceeds to explain that the choice to employ class arbitration is
not a mere "procedural" matter within the gap-filling authority of the
arbitrator. 2 3 Rather, "class-action arbitration changes the nature of
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties
17 Id. at 1443 (plurality opinion).
18 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree,
326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946)).
19 Id. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
see also id. at 1439 n.4 (majority opinion) ("[W]e express no view as to whether state
laws that set a ceiling on damages recoverable in a single suit are pre-empted [under
the Rules Enabling Act]." (citation omitted)).
20 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
21 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010).
22 Id. at 1775 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84
(2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23 Id.
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consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an
arbitrator.

24

Rhetoric is revealing here. The Court repeatedly describes a shift
from one-on-one arbitration to class arbitration as transformative in
nature-as a "crucial difference[ ]," a "fundamental change[ ]," and
hence something "too great" to be presumed to lie within the gapfilling power of the arbitrator absent more specific contractual language. 25 The fundamental difference consists of the capacity of class
arbitration to resolve not just a bilateral dispute but, rather, "many
disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands" that implicate
"the rights of absent parties. ' 26 For the Stolt-Nielsen Court, the distinctive reach of class arbitration to absent parties means that one may not
cast the question of its use "as being merely [about] what 'procedural
mode' is available.

'27

Shady Grove makes a fleeting appearance in Stolt-Nielsen, but only
in the way that director Alfred Hitchcock was apt to appear inconspicuously in the background of scenes within his suspense films. 28 The

Stolt-Nielsen majority does not mention Shady Grove at all. That precedent appears injustice Ginsburg's Stolt-Nielsen dissent and, even then,
merely as a "cf." citation for her view that the arbitrators there simply
decided "the procedural mode available for presentation of [the] antitrust claims" on the merits.2 9 This view itself contrasts with Justice
Ginsburg's own dissent in Shady Grove, in which she characterizes the
New York bar on class actions for statutory damages as having a substantive dimension and therefore as binding in a federal diversity
action. 30 Thus, although the majorities and the dissents across the
two cases have overlapping membership,3 1 each camp appears to
24 Id.
25 See id. at 1776.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 For a detailed list, see List of Hitchcock Cameo Appearances, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/List-ofHitchcock-cameoappearances (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
29 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
30 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1464 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (characterizing New York section 901(b) as an
embodiment of state "regulatory policy"); id. at 1466 (describing section 901(b) as

designed "to control the size of a monetary award a class plaintiff may pursue").
31 Three members of the Court were in the majority in both cases: Chief Justice
Roberts andJustices Scalia and Thomas. TwoJustices dissented in both cases:Justices

Ginsburg and Breyer. Three Justices notably maintained consistent positions as to
class treatment across the two cases. Justices Kennedy and Alito dissented in Shady
Grove but joined the majority in Stolt-Nielsen, whereas Justice Stevens concurred in

Shady Grove and dissented in Stolt-Nielsen. Justice Sotomayorjoined the portion of the
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adopt diametrically opposing views about the nature of class
treatment.
If litigation and arbitration really are dichotomous modes for civil
dispute resolution, then that dichotomy would seem to be doing considerable work. What Shady Grove deems an incidental effect that
poses no categorical bar to class litigation morphs, in Stolt-Nielsen, into
the fundamental difference that bars class arbitration in the face of
contractual silence on the question. Across the two cases, the Court
maintains an almost studied avoidance of any explanation for the difference of view as to class treatment. Based simply on what the Court
says, one seemingly could transpose the remarks about the nature of
class treatment from one decision into the other and flip the
outcomes.
This Article takes the contrast between Shady Grove and Stolt-Nielsen as a point of departure for a broader engagement of the relationship between litigation and arbitration. In our modern world of
globalized commerce, arbitration is less an "alternative" dispute resolution mode and more commonplace, such that its relationship to litigation is apt to exhibit less dichotomy and more doctrinal
convergence. In urging a more synthetic understanding of litigation
and arbitration, this Article advances three main claims.
First, for all their salient differences, the Court's accounts of class
treatment under the Rules Enabling Act and the FAA evidence a
deep, underlying convergence between litigation and arbitration doctrine. This convergence remains unnoticed-certainly, undertheorized-by both the Court itself and commentary to date. The
Court's decisions in Shady Grove and Stolt-Nielsen afford an opportunity
to expose this convergence and to assess its merits.
Shady Grove continues the Court's longstanding effort to police
the line between questions in federal diversity cases properly treated
under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins32 and those appropriately analyzed under Hanna v. Plumer.3

3

For the majority in Shady

Grove, the existence of Rule 23 on when a class action may be maintained in federal court places Shady Grove squarely in the Hanna column. The result-the Court holds-is the displacement of New York
section 901(b) to the contrary, as long as Rule 23 itself is "rationally

Shady Grove plurality opinion concerning the nature of the class action, but was
recused in Stolt-Nielsen.
32 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
33 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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capable of classification" as governing "procedure" within the mean-

34
ing of the Rules Enabling Act.

I initially situate Shady Grove within a longstanding debate over
the interaction of the class action device with remedies in the nature
of statutory damages, explaining how the peculiar posture of the case
leaves undisturbed a valuable line of lower court decisions-precedents that speak to the required determination under Rule 23(b) (3)
that "a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy." 35 As to the superiority
requirement of Rule 23(b) (3), there is room for federal court consideration of guidance found in state law, even if it is not strictly binding
in the Erie sense.
Beyond the particulars of Shady Grove, the upshot of the Hanna
doctrine has been to lend a formalistic, categorical quality to the
Court's treatments of conflicts between the Federal Rules and state
law in diversity cases. Put bluntly, since Hanna, if the Federal Rule
truly conflicts with state law, then the real-world effects of that Rule
upon claiming are deemed merely incidental and, hence, short of the
Rules Enabling Act stricture against the alteration of substantive
rights. 36 Placement of a given case in the Erie column, by contrast,
prompts a more functional inquiry that deems state law binding as
against the creation of federal common law based on the "touchstone"
of whether the choice between the two is outcome-determinative, con37
sidered in retrospect.
The Rules Enabling Act and the Federal Arbitration Act are
clearly not the same. As I shall explain, nonetheless, the Court's FAA
jurisprudence has come substantially to replicate key structural features of the Hannaand Erie doctrines, respectively. The demarcation
between the two in the arbitration setting tracks the line between
cases focused on the command of FAA § 2 to validate arbitration
agreements in private contracts and cases focused on the caveat at the
34 See id. at 472.
35 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
36 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1442 (2010) (plurality opinion) ("Applying th[e] test [of Hanna and related precedents], we have rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come
before us."). Like the Court, I speak here of cases in which it is not possible to avoid
the conflict through judicial construction of the Federal Rule in question. See, e.g.,
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (avoiding conflict between
Rule 59 for new trials and state standard for judicial review ofjury awards); Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (avoiding conflict between Rule 3 on commencement of actions and state statute of limitations).
37 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (citing Guar. Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).
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end of § 2 that preserves generally applicable contract defenses in
state law. "Command" cases are governed by a counterpart to the
Hanna doctrine, whereas "caveat" cases follow a counterpart to Erie.
Specifically, when the Court has considered the categories of civil
claims that arbitration may encompass, the arbitration clause wins on
Hanna-like terms, 3 8 with the opportunity for the claimant to vindicate
her substantive rights in the arbitral forum regarded as undisturbed.
This Hanna counterpart for the FAA-if one will-is susceptible to
criticism for effectively equating the institutional authority of private
contracts with that of the rulemaking process prescribed by the Rules
Enabling Act. As I shall elaborate, however, the emerging parallels
between litigation and arbitration here flow from a deeper structural
similarity that recasts the institutional question.
The Court's Hannadoctrine for the Rules Enabling Act speaks to
the relationship between federal and state law. Its unarticulated counterpart for the FAA speaks to the relationship among rival lawmakers
at a different level: the relationship of U.S. law to that of other nations
in our increasingly globalized world of commerce. Recent scholarly
accounts express consternation over the Court's steady expansion of
the types of civil claims that arbitration may encompass but, in so
doing, have obscured the transnational dimension of the Court's
jurisprudence.

39

Seen in a transnational light, the wide array of civil claims that
may be subject to arbitration under the Court's FAA decisions reflects
not so much a sense of hubris about private contracting as, instead, a
welcome modesty about the capacity of U.S. law-including the
processes of U.S. civil litigation-to govern the world. The Rule
23-style class action is a fixture of the U.S. landscape at both the federal and state levels, but that device remains decidedly anomalous
from a comparative perspective. 40 This comparative perspective, I
38 My characterization here remains confined to the allocation of particular categories of civil claims across litigation and arbitration. The arbitration clause does not
win, insofar as it purports to provide for judicial review of arbitral awards on grounds
more extensive than those prescribed by the FAA itself. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel,
Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008). But, even then, only "the expeditious judicial review"
provided by the FAA is lost; the ordinary modes for enforcement of private contracts
remain available. Id. at 590.
39 See, e.g., David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REv. 605 (2010); Daniel Markovits, Arbitration's Arbitrage:
Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and Contract,59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431 (2010);
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631
(2005); Resnik, supra note 1.
40 See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
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argue, lends to the holding in Stolt-Nielsen the needed explanation
that the Court there failed to supply.
By contrast, for situations in which state law unconscionability
doctrine is in play and the federal law command to validate the arbitration clause is correspondingly in doubt, per the caveat in FAA § 2, a
counterpart to the Erie doctrine applies. This similarity-once
noted-should not be surprising, for the Erie doctrine within its own
domain seeks to manage the relationship between state law and a
body of would-be federal law of dubious provenance (general federal
common law). Under the FAA counterpart to the Erie doctrine, the
question becomes not the formal, categorical one of "substance" versus "procedure" but, instead, the functional one of whether the arbitration clause-evaluated in real-world, operational terms-makes
claiming "prohibitive[ ],,41 so as to be tantamount to the kinds of
exculpatory clauses long deemed unconscionable in ordinary contracts, apart from any arbitration clause. The distinction between the
arbitration counterparts to the Hanna and Erie doctrines lends organization to the Court's FAA jurisprudence in a way not previously
recognized.
Second, a clearer understanding of litigation and arbitration
along the foregoing lines sheds light on a fiercely contested question
before the Court during its October 2010 Term. AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion42 concerns the permissibility, under the FAA, of arbitration clauses that are not silent as to class treatment (as in Stolt-Nielsen)
but, instead, include "class waivers"-provisions that purport to waive
any opportunity to participate in a class arbitration or a class action in
court. The central argument against class waivers is that they purport
to do something that public legislation may do but that private contracts may not-namely, operate as exculpatory clauses by repealing,
43
in practical effect, a private right of action contained in existing law.
As I shall detail, the particulars of the arbitration clause in Concepcion frame this issue in a stark form-in terms of whether a class
waiver is impermissible in the face of claimants' "acknowledge [ment]"
41 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000).
42 Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub
non. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S.Ct. 3322 (2010).
43 For earlier framings of the pre- Concepcion debate over class waivers in terms of

institutional allocation between public legislatures and private contracts, see Samuel
Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit CardAccountability, 73 U. CmI. L. REv. 157, 172-75
(2006); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure,

Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1872, 1902 (2006); andJ. Maria
Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements, 59 VAD. L. R~v. 1735, 1764-67 (2006).
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that other features of the arbitration clause "prompt[ ] [the defendant company] to accept liability, rather than 'escape liability.' ',44 For
the Ninth Circuit in Concepcion, the problem nonetheless remains that
"not every aggrieved customer will file a claim,

'4 5

as effectively would

occur in a class-wide proceeding that would confront the defendant
with the full scope of its alleged wrong in such a manner as to be
fundamentally different from joinder.
I explain how the particulars of Concepcion call for careful attention to the line between the FAA counterparts to the Hanna and Erie
doctrines. Properly understood, Concepcion does not present a bona
fide FAA § 2 caveat case under the FAA counterpart to the Erie doctrine but, rather, a § 2 command case under the counterpart to
Hanna. The conception of unconscionability on the part of the lower
courts-one decoupled from notions of exculpation-actually replicates in the FAA context the same misstep that warranted Supreme
Court reversal in Shady Grove. It bears emphasis, nonetheless, that this
account of Concepcion leaves ample room for judicial scrutiny of class
waivers in cases that really do implicate the caveat in FAA § 2-specifically, when class waivers stand unadorned by other features to remove
the arbitration clause from the category of the exculpatory.
Third, I step back from doctrine to reflect in broader institutional
terms upon the litigation-arbitration dichotomy. Pinpointing of the
deep similarities between the Hanna and Erie doctrines in their own
context of civil-litigation federalism and their counterparts under the
FAA raises the prospect of greater dialogue, rather than dichotomy,
across the two domains. Such a dialogue, I contend, is much needed
to inform both judicial decisions and any future engagement by Congress with proposed amendments to the FAA.
This Article elaborates these points in three Parts, which correspond to the matters at issue in Shady Grove, Stolt-Nielsen, and Concepcion, respectively.
I.

CLAss

ACTIONS AND THE RULES ENABLING ACT

Questions about the legitimacy of the modem class action under
the Rules Enabling Act have not escaped the attention of commentary.46 As this Part initially explains, the odd posture of Shady Grove
44 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at
*10 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), affd sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d
849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S.
Ct. 3322 (2010).
45 Laster, 584 F.3d at 856 n.9.
46 See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE ch. 3 (2009).
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cast the Rules Enabling Act question in a manner that obscured-for
both the lawyers and, seemingly, the Court itself-the significance of
lower court decisions with the potential to make the question unnecessary to resolve for purposes of class certification. This Part then analyzes the Court's answer to the Rules Enabling Act question, taking as
given its peculiar framing in Shady Grove.
A.

Statutory Damages and Remedial Overkill in the Aggregate

The Rules Enabling Act question in Shady Grove presents a permutation of a larger, ongoing question surrounding the class action
device-namely, its proper interaction with remedies in the nature of
statutory damages. The starting point here consists of the recognition
that a legislature might opt to authorize a damages remedy unlike the
familiar forms of compensatory damages keyed to actual loss on the
plaintiffs part. New York section 901 (b) in Shady Grove captures this
category through its reference to "a statute creating or imposing.. . a
minimum measure of recovery.

47

Statutory damages are far from an oddball feature of New York
law. Numerous federal statutes also provide for damages on a per48
violation or per-claimant basis, apart from any showing of actual loss.
The federal courts, moreover, have long grappled with efforts to seek
certification of class actions for such relief.
1. The Problem of Double Counting
The class certification question is easy enough when the underlyexpressly contemplates such treatment and imposes an
statute
ing
49
aggregate cap on the statutory damages obtainable via a class action.
The more difficult scenario arises when underlying law is silent as to
the interaction of its statutory damages remedy with the class action
47 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006).
48 See, e.g., Fair Credit Transaction Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (1) (A) (2006) (providing for "any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of [a] failure [to
comply with a requirement imposed under the Act] or damages of not less than $100
and not more than $1,000 . . ."); Cable Communication Policy Act, 47 U.S.C.

§ 551(f)(2) (A) (2006) (providing for "actual damages but not less than liquidated
damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000,
whichever is higher").
49 The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, for example, provides for statutory
damages "not exceeding $1,000" in "the case of any action by an individual," but caps
such damages at "the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt
collector" in "the case of a class action." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (2) (A)-(B); see also id.
§ 1640(a) (2) (B) (instating same aggregate cap for class actions seeking statutory damages under the Truth in Lending Act).
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mechanism. The point of trepidation here consists of the fear voiced
in the legislative materials canvassed by Shady Grove dissenters: the
notion that the addition of class treatment on top of statutory damages would not effectuate underlying law but, rather, distort it into a
form of remedial "overkill. ' 50 Put differently, the concern is that class
treatment would amount to a form of double counting by adding the
formidable claim facilitation of that device to a statutory regime
already designed to provide incentives for claiming on an individual
51
basis.
The mode of individual claiming for statutory damages warrants
explication here, for it shall surface again in connection with class
waivers in arbitration. Statutory damages characteristically come
along with authorization for the court to award "reasonable" attorneys' fees and "costs" upon a determination of liability.5 2 In this

regard, regimes for statutory damages exist in continuity with other
settings for fee shifting that clearly do encompass the possibility of
class actions-most prominently, civil rights litigation 5 3 in which the
remedy for claimants might not necessarily take a monetary form but,
instead, might consist of injunctive or declaratory relief.
As to lawsuits over both statutory damages and civil rights, one
might say the legislative framework embodies a goal of incentivizing
claiming, but without thereby creating a litigation bonanza. In fact,
shortly before its decision in Shady Grove, the Court underscored the
delicate balance of legislative objectives as to claiming in these terms,
54
when addressing fee shifting in civil rights class actions specifically.
There, fee-shifting statutes notably do not encompass expenses for
expert witnesses,5 5 notwithstanding their practical importance for the
development of complex civil rights claims.
50 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1464 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
51 See id.
52 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (3); 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2)(C). The claims in Shady
Grove likewise were subject to fee shifting. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney
2006).
53 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 624 n.1 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing major federal feeshifting statutes).
54 See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Wynn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1673 (2010) (noting that
"the aim" of fee-shifting provisions "is to enforce the covered civil rights statutes, not
to 'provide a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys'" (quot-

ing Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565
(1986))).
55 SeeArlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 301 (2006)
("[N]o [fee-shifting] statute will be construed as authorizing the taxation of witness
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The Superiority Requirement of Rule 23(b) (3)

Over time, decisions of the lower federal courts have accumulated on class certification for statutory damages. Even in the face of
silence in underlying law concerning the interaction of statutory damages with the class action mechanism, it is far from clear that certification should be forthcoming under Rule 23. A 2003 case from the
Second Circuit-Parker v. Time Warner EntertainmentC. 56-lends context to this point. The plaintiff class in Parkeralleged that the defendant cable television company had disclosed customer information to
third parties, without informing the customers themselves. 5 7 One
thousand dollars in statutory damages to each of the estimated twelve
million customers of Time Warner for each unauthorized disclosure
would have made for a firm-threatening liability of twelve billion
58
dollars.
This is not to say that high-stakes claims somehow are always inappropriate for class certification. Nor it is to suggest that unauthorized
disclosure of customer information somehow is unworthy of legal regulation. But how plausible is it to think that Congress really wished to
threaten firms like Time Warner with bankruptcy in the absence of
actual harm? In particular, how plausible is that inference upon recognition of the potential alternatives of public regulatory enforcement or an individual consumer action, induced by the prospect of
fee shifting to cover her attorney's fees and costs? The specific concern, again, is that the whopping difference in liability exposure occasioned by class treatment would distort, rather than effectuate,
underlying law not calibrated with the notion of market-wide private
enforcement in mind. Statutory damages are in play, after all, only
when claimants' actual losses-if any-fall below the specified sum.
The Parkerclass did not seek actual damages for, say, any manner of
identity theft.
As the Second Circuit cautioned, "[i]t may be that the aggregation in a class action of large numbers of statutory damages claims
potentially distorts the purpose of both statutory damages and class
actions" by "creat[ing] a potentially enormous aggregate recovery for
plaintiffs, and thus an in terrorem effect on defendants, which may
fees as costs unless the statute 'refer[s] explicitly to witness fees.'" (third alteration in

the original) (quoting Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445
(1987))).
56 331 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 2003).
57 See id. at 14.
58 See id. at 25-26.
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induce unfair settlements. ' 59 In this regard, the Second Circuit's language in Parker carries forward the concern voiced in an oft-cited 1972
treatment of class certification for statutory damages by a district court
within the same circuit in Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.60
The significance of Ratner is to pinpoint within Rule 23 the basis for
judicial discretion to decline certification.
Rule 23(b) (3) calls for, among other things, a judicial determination that the proposed class action "is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." 6 1
Class certification may well not be "superior" to individual litigationindeed, it may be inferior-on "fair [ness]" grounds due to the lack of
need for aggregation of the prescribed dollar sum in order to provide
62
a sufficient incentive for claiming within the meaning of the statute.
In its treatment of the Rule 23(b) (3) superiority requirement, Ratner
is far from an outlier. Many other lower court decisions since Ratner
have taken the same view, though the case law-to be sure-is not
strictly uniform. 63 The important point remains that, even without a
bar on class certification for statutory damages, the terms of Rule 23
64
make class certification far from a sure thing.
59 Id. at 22.
60 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
61 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3). Subsection (b) (3) provides, by far, the most commonly invoked basis for certification of class actions for damages. The other subsection amenable to class treatment of damages claims-Rule 23(b)(1)(B)-affords
certification only in the narrowly circumscribed scenario of a limited fund available
for the satisfaction of competing claims. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,
838-40 (1999) (discussing stringency of requirements for Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class
certification).
62 Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 412, 416.
63 For more detailed discussion, see Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten:
The Problem of Statutory Damages and Class Actions, 74 Mo. L. REv. 103, 146-51 (2009).
64 Denial of class certification is not always the right outcome, because all provisions for statutory damages are not alike. When the terms of the statutes themselves
afford judicial discretion-say, by providing for statutory damages "not exceeding" a
specified sum, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (2) (A) (2006), or within a prescribed dollar
range, id. § 1681n(a) (1) (A)-certification of a class action for a nondraconian aggregate level of statutory damages may well be "superior" to no certification at all. The
superiority problem arises most acutely when the underlying statute affords no latitude for avoidance of remedial overkill in the aggregate, as in both Parker and Ratner.
The underlying statute in Parker provided for "liquidated damages computed at the
rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher." 47 U.S.C.
§ 551 (f) (2) (A); see Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 331 F.3d 13, 25 (2d Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., concurring). The overkill concern in Ratner arose from "provisions for
a $100 minimum recovery." Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 416 (analyzing the Truth in Lending
Act, prior to addition of aggregate cap on statutory damages for class actions
thereunder).
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Recognition of the potential superiority problem under Rule 23
serves to highlight the odd posture in which Shady Grove reached the
Supreme Court. New York section 901 (b) came up in a way that
framed the question of its applicability in a federal diversity case in onor-off terms. In Shady Grove, the district court had granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, on the ground that section 901 (b) is binding
in a federal diversity action and, so the court believed, comprises a
determinative, nondiscretionary basis on which to dismiss the case
entirely. 65 As such, neither the district court nor the Second Circuit
When the underlying statute itself affords no discretion to avoid remedial overkill
in the aggregate, class counsel might attempt to invoke one or another problematic
line of argument. Invoking the absurdity doctrine of statutory interpretation, class
counsel might suggest to the court a source of judicial authority to deviate from the
statutorily specified dollar sum to the extent needed to facilitate class certification.
See Parker, 331 F.3d at 23 (Newman, J., concurring). This view belies the premise of
the absurdity doctrine itself that the absurd result-here, class certification for firmthreatening liability-otherwise is unavoidable. That result is readily avoidable, without deviation from the specified statutory sum, via decertification on the basis of the
superiority requirement of Rule 23(b) (3). See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3).
A similar line of argument seeks to draw, by analogy, on the practice of remittitur, whereby a reviewing court may offer the recipient of an unreasonably high jury
award of conventional damages the option of accepting a lesser amount, within permissible bounds, in lieu of having to undergo a new trial. See 11 CHARLES ALAN
WIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2815, at 160 (2d ed. 1995).
Remittitur, however, stems from the supervisory authority of the court over the jury to
avoid unreasonable damage awards. See id. at 159. The court does not have comparable supervisory authority vis-A-vis the legislature to rewrite a specified dollar sum for
statutory damages. But the court does have discretion under the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b) (3) to deny certification. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
65 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d
467, 470-72, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), affd, 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct.
1431 (2010). Even on the district court's own terms, outright dismissal is the wrong
disposition. New York section 901 (b) provides that an action for statutory damages
.may not be maintained as a class action," absent specific authorization of that format
in underlying law. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006) (emphasis added). The
usual disposition of an action that cannot be maintained as a class action is not outright dismissal but, rather, continuation of the individual action of the would-be class
representative, if she so wishes.
The inclination of the district court to dismiss the lawsuit outright appears to
stem from a misunderstanding as to subject matter jurisdiction. The proposed class
action in Shady Grove clearly satisfied the requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions set forth in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)namely, minimal diversity of citizenship and more than five million dollars in controversy in the aggregate. See Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d) (2) (A) (2006)). The district court appears to have believed that the inability of the action to be maintained as a class action due to New York section 901(b)
threw this basis for subject matter jurisdiction into doubt. See id. at 472. The individual action of the class representative would not have satisfied the usual amount in
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on appeal in Shady Grove considered whether the proposed class
action would have satisfied Rule 23, even if New York section 901 (b)
were not binding under the Erie doctrine. 6 6 Indeed, none of the
briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in Shady Grove appears to have
flagged the potential superiority obstacle under Rule 23, notwithstanding its frequency in lower court decisions, including precedents
from within the circuit from which the case arose.
The peculiar posture of Shady Grove is no mere detail. It influences the way that one should understand the Court's holding that
New York section 901 (b) is not binding in a federal diversity casethat is, as a ruling that section 901 (b) does not comprise a determinative, open-and-shut reason for the federal court to withhold class treatment, not as a decision that endangers the distinct, discretionary
inquiry into superiority under Rule 23(b) (3) in cases involving statutory damages. Passing language in Shady Grove has a tendency to convey the mistaken impression that section 901(b) stood as the only
meaningful obstacle to class certification, with satisfaction of Rule 23
being a foregone conclusion, once section 901 (b) is deemed
67
nonbinding.
If silence in a statutory damages provision concerning the availability of class treatment runs into a potential superiority problem
under Rule 23-as in Ratner and its progeny-then surely the prescontroversy for diversity jurisdiction of $75,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 1332 (a); Shady Grove,
466 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
It is now clear, however, that a denial of class certification in a case in federal
court on the basis of the special diversity standard for class actions under CAFA does
not mean that the remaining individual action of the class representative then must
satisfy the usual diversity standard. Rather, the individual action may remain in federal court, with its jurisdictional propriety still governed by the special CAFA standard. See USW v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Had
Congress intended that a properly removed class action be remanded if a class is not
eventually certified, it could have said so. We think it more likely that Congress
intended that the usual and long-standing principles apply-post-filing developments
do not defeat jurisdiction if jurisdiction was properly invoked as of the time of filing."). Accord Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806-07 (7th
Cir. 2010); Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1268 n.12 (11th Cir. 2009).
66 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
67 The superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) makes no appearance in any of
the opinions in Shady Grove. Insofar as the Court refers to subsection (b) of Rule 23 at
all, the Court does so only to deem the specifications of that subsection "irrelevant for
present purposes." Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S.
Ct. 1431, 1436 n.2 (2010). The Court goes on to describe Rule 23 as "creat[ing] a
categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue
his claim as a class action," with no inkling that those criteria might form an obstacle,
once New York section 901(b) is deemed nonbinding. Id. at 1437.
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ence of a state law specification against class treatment can only accentuate the problem. Even if New York section 901 (b) is not strictly
binding in a federal diversity case in the Erie sense, the court should
not treat that state provision as if it were chopped liver. Rather, section 901 (b) properly informs the discretionary judicial inquiry into
superiority under Rule 23(b) (3), adding to the doubts about superiority that would arise even without such a state law stricture. 68 69Comity
properly operates, even without the presence of compulsion.
At a minimum, recognition of the superiority problem for class
certification under the terms of Rule 23 raises the prospect that the
Court's Shady Grove holding may well have resolved an abstract question, with no ultimate, practical consequence for the certification
question in similar situations. The district court might have deferred
a ruling on the motion to dismiss7 0 and, instead, denied class certification on superiority grounds under Rule 23(b) (3), with New York section 901 (b) taken to inform the court's discretion, if not necessarily to
be binding. One seriously doubts whether the case would have garnered Supreme Court review, had the district court-sitting within
the circuit of Parkerand Ratner, no less-so proceeded.
B.

Hanna v. Plumer Redux

Whatever one might say about the peculiar posture of Shady
Grove, the Court's decision in the case bears attention for its characterization of the class action in light of the Rules Enabling Act. As subse68 The presence of a state law specification against class certification addresses
the concern on the part of courts prepared to certify statutory damages claims notwithstanding whopping liability exposure in the aggregate-namely, that courts have
no legal authority to recoil from the aggregation of the statutorily specified sum on a
class-wide basis. See Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953-54 (7th Cir.
2006).
69 In still another variation, a right of action in federal law may incorporate state
law limitations, including those found in state procedural rules. The federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) provides a cause of action to recover a statutory penalty of $500 for each instance ofjunk fax transmission "if otherwise permitted
by the laws or rules of court of a State." 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006). In a
post-Shady Grove decision, the Second Circuit held that New York section 901 (b) bars
a federal court diversity class action for statutory penalties under the TCPA for New
York consumers-not because of any Erie compulsion but, rather, as a matter of statutory interpretation, based on the reference to state "rules of court" in the underlying
federal right of action. See Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 618 F.3d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 2010).
70 This would have been an option had the district court correctly understood
the relationship of the special diversity jurisdiction standard for class actions under
CAFA and the ordinary diversity jurisdiction standard for nonclass cases. See supra
note 65 and accompanying text (discussing confusion over subject matter jurisdiction
under CAFA in Shady Grove).
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quent Parts of this Article shall elaborate, this characterization has
implications beyond the confines of Shady Grove itself. The upshot of
the Court's treatment is easy enough to summarize: Given the existence of Rule 23, which specifies when an action may be maintained
in federal court as a class action, the district court erred by "wad[ing]
into Erie's murky waters. ' 71 Analysis instead should proceed under
the distinct doctrinal line of Hanna v. Plumer and related
72
precedents.
Under Hanna, the only question is whether Rule 23 is valid under
the Rules Enabling Act. If so, then Rule 23 displaces New York section
901(b) to the contrary. 73 One way to approach this question is to
focus on the capacity of Rule 23 to alter dramatically the incidence of
claiming by encompassing in the class absent persons who have not
sued individually and, indeed, might never do so. For both the Scalia
plurality and the Stevens concurrence, however, this real-world effect
74
on claiming is merely incidental.
But there is also a more nuanced distinction drawn under the
Rules Enabling Act itself. The Act authorizes the Court "to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure" but prohibits the promulga75
tion of rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."
The plurality and the concurrence part company over the relationship
between these two aspects of the Act and thus over the room that they
leave, in general, for displacement of state law by the Federal Rules.
The plurality affords a wide berth for the Federal Rules. Quoting
the most expansive language from Hanna, the Shady Grove plurality
validates under the Rules Enabling Act caveat all Federal Rules that
"regulate matters 'rationally capable of classification' as procedure. '76
On this account, "[t]he test is not whether the [federal] rule affects a
litigant's substantive rights; most procedural rules do." 7 7 For the plu71 Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1437.
72 See id. at 1442 (plurality opinion); id. at 1456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
73 The Court concludes correctly, in my view, that the language of New York section 901 (b)-which provides that an action for statutory damages "may not be maintained as a class action" absent specific authorization of that format in underlying
law-unavoidably conflicts with the specifications of Rule 23(b) as to when a class
action "may be maintained." See id. at 1437-38 (majority opinion) (construing FED.
R. Crv. P. 23(b); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006)).
74 See id. at 1443 (plurality opinion); id. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
75 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b) (2006).
76 Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)).
77 Id. (citing Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946)).
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rality, "[w] hat matters is what the rule itself regulates: If it governs
only 'the manner and the means' by which the litigants' rights are
'enforced,' it is valid; if it alters 'the rules of decision by which [the]
court will adjudicate [those] rights,' it is not."78 And application of
Rule 23 alters neither the legal elements for the Shady Grove plaintiffs'
claims on the merits nor the $500-apiece sum for the remedy
79
sought.
By contrast, the Stevens concurrence calls attention to the possibility that "[a] 'state procedural rule, though undeniably procedural
in the ordinary sense of the term,' may exist 'to influence substantive
outcomes,' and may in some instances become so bound up with the
state-created right or remedy that it defines the scope of that substantive right or remedy." 80 Even under this view, however, "the bar for
finding an Enabling Act problem is a high one.... The mere possibility that a federal rule would alter a state-created right is not sufficient.
81
There must be little doubt."
Still, for all their jousting with one another, the Scalia plurality
and the Stevens concurrence coalesce on the proposition that Hanna,
not Erie, controls with regard to class certification standards in Shady
78 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Publ'g Corp., 326 U.S. at 446).
79 The $500 sum stemmed from specification in New York insurance law of "a
penalty of two percent interest calculated monthly" for overdue insurance payments.
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), affd, 549 F.3d 137 (2d. Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S.Ct. 1431 (2010).
There was no dispute that this sum came within the reference in New York section
901(b) to class actions for "a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery." N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 901 (b) (McKinney 2006).
80 Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1450 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in thejudgment) (citation omitted) (quoting S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also id. at 1455 n.13 ("[W]hat is procedural in one context may be substantive in
another.").
81
Id. at 1457. The Stevens concurrence identifies no example of such a state
rule. One possible candidate consists of provisions in the area of wage-and-hour regulation that replicate the opt-in format for class actions in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1012(b) (Lexis-Nexis 2007) ("No
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any [class] action brought under this subchapter
[concerning minimum wages] unless the employee gives written consent to become a
party and the written consent is filed in the court in which the action is brought.").
The FLSA opt-in class action provision appears in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). Cf
Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1984) (discussing congressional objective to limit representative litigation under FLSA through adoption of
opt-in class mechanism). In a federal court class action for FLSA claims, the opt-in
format of the FLSA governs as to those claims, not the opt-out format of Rule
23(b) (3) for damages class actions generally. See Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003).
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Grove. In hindsight, it has become apparent how sweeping the category of Federal Rules "rationally capable of classification" as governing procedure really is. Within a decade of Hannaitself, an iconic
scholarly article observed that the Court's decision there has
amounted to "a singularly hard-hearted" doctrine, whereby any Federal Rule "that is even arguably procedural is to be applied in a diversity action, state law to the contrary notwithstanding."' 2 In effect,
Hanna and its progeny amount to a Will Rogers theory of the Rules
Enabling Act caveat-one whereby the Court has never yet met a Federal Rule that it didn't like.8 3 The Court "ha[s] rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before [it],"84 and
Shady Grove continues the streak.
This is not necessarily bad, at least for ease ofjudicial administration. The formal-even mechanical-quality of the Hanna doctrine
celebrated by the Shady Grove plurality effectively avoids the need "to
assess the substantive or procedural character of countless state rules
that may conflict with a single Federal Rule." 85 The Stevens concurrence and the Ginsburg dissent would open the door to such inquiry,
to varying degrees. 8 6 And any such opening would not remain confined to Rule 23, which might explain the inclination to deem even
the formidable claim-enabling effect of that rule to be merely incidental and no different in kind from joinder. If even Rule 23 does not
contravene the Rules Enabling Act caveat in the face of a state law like
New York section 901 (b), then the other Rules would seem very safe
indeed.
The debate among the Justices in Shady Grove goes beyond the
usual choice between relatively formal rules and more contextual standards in Supreme Court jurisprudence.8 7 The inclination of the plurality to foreclose fine-grained consideration of state law effectively
82 John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HA.v. L. REv. 693, 697 (1974).
83 The allusion is to Will Rogers's response, when asked about Leon Trotsky. See
BEN YAGODA, WILL ROGERS 234 (1993).
84 Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion).
85 Id. at 1447 (criticizing the limited parameters for inquiry that the Stevens concurrence would leave open). The plurality ridicules even more strongly the broader
latitude for inquiry urged by the Shady Grove dissenters as an approach focused on
"the subjective intentions of the state legislature" and thus "an enterprise destined to
produce 'confusion worse confounded.'" Id. at 1440-44 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
86 The replacement of Justice Stevens with Justice Kagan injects an additional
layer of uncertainty.
87 See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HLv. L. REv. 22 (1992) (offering discussion and examples of how the Justices
split on results and methods).
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places the guardianship of state autonomy not in the courts but,
instead, in the rulemaking process prescribed by the Rules Enabling
Act. 88 As the Hanna Court observed, ajudicial decision to invalidate a
Federal Rule as an alteration of substantive law effectively would say
that "the [Rules] Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress
erred."8 9
When this rulemaking process has occurred, it governs, such that
the federal courts will declare, in so many words: "We have our Rule,
and we're sticking to it." This upshot of the Hannadoctrine contrasts
with the more functional inquiry undertaken in a bona fide Erie situation. There, the choice is not between state law and federal law, as
already adopted by Congress or one of its rulemaking delegates.
Under the Erie doctrine, the choice instead lies between state law and
the creation of federal 'judge-made rules." 90 As to the latter choice,
the Erie doctrine directs attention not to formal categorization of the
judge-made rule as "substance or procedure" but, instead, to the realworld, functional question of "whether it 'significantly affect[s] the
result of a litigation"' as compared to what it would be under the state
law in question. 9 1 What is a mere incidental effect on a formal analysis may well "affect[ ] the result of a litigation" under such a func92
tional inquiry.
As the next Part shall explain, the contrast between categorical
and functional analysis under the Hanna and Eie doctrines, respectively, helps to organize the debate over arbitration clauses in ways not
otherwise apparent. The next Part situates the view of class arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen within the Court's larger Federal Arbitration Act
jurisprudence-a body of learning with features strikingly similar to
those of the Hanna doctrine but previously unnoticed in those terms.
The reasons for this convergence across the litigation-arbitration
dichotomy cast in a new light the seemingly divergent accounts of
class treatment across the two domains in Shady Grove and Stolt-Nielsen.
88 In this respect, one might say that the practical implications of the Hannadoctrine operate in continuity with accounts of federalism more broadly that emphasize
political safeguards over judicially enforced doctrines as the main guardians of state
autonomy. SeeJESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROcEss 175-83 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.

543 (1954).
89 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
90 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion).
91 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109
(1945)).
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The view of class actions in Shady Grove contrasts sharply with the
account of class arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen. The formidable claim-enabling effect of class treatment that the Shady Grove Court deems incidental in litigation becomes a fundamental difference in StoltNielsen-what the Court there invokes to explain why arbitrators lack
authority to pursue class arbitration when the arbitration clause is
93
silent on the availability of that format.
This Part offers a revisionist defense of the holding in Stolt-Nielsen. The first subpart highlights a transnational dimension to Court's
FAA jurisprudence, situating that dimension by comparison to the
relations between the federal government and the states in the U.S.
domestic sphere to which Erie and Hanna speak. The second subpart
then explains how this transnational dimension to the FAA lends support to the Court's view of class arbitration-albeit, on grounds not
explained by the Court itself. This is not to suggest that arbitration in
the international sphere somehow should be treated differently than
in the domestic setting. Quite the opposite: it is precisely because the
two cannot be separated in our globalized world that courts should
calibrate the interpretive principles for the FAA with attention to their
operation in both domains.
A.

Federalism, Globalism, and the Need for Governance

The Hanna doctrine at issue in Shady Grove polices the authority
of the federal rulemaking process in matters of procedure vis-A-vis the
authority of states to craft substantive law. On its face, the FAA does
not focus so much on vertical lawmaking authority in the federal-state
sense as on the allocation of authority across public and private lines.
Subject to an important caveat that shall warrant close attention in the
next Part, the command of FAA § 2 consists of a declaration that a
contract "to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" as a
matter of federal law. 94 In institutional terms, § 2 empowers private
93 Compare id. at 1443 ("[A class action] leaves the parties' legal rights and duties
intact and the rules of decision unchanged."), and id. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (purporting that the arguments concerning
class certification enlarging substantive rights "rest on extensive speculation"), with
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (noting the

"fundamental changes" by shifting from a bilateral to class action arbitration).
94 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 1 speak here of arbitration not governed by treaty. For
treaty-governed arbitration-essentially, international commercial arbitration-the
source of enforcement technically is not FAA § 2 but, rather, a separate chapter of the
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contracting to reallocate civil disputes in advance-to take them out
of the background regime of litigation (including extant rules of civil
procedure) and into the private realm of arbitration.
In a long-running series of decisions, the Court has deemed the
FAA to establish a "federal policy favoring arbitration" with such
strength that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration."9 5 The universe of civil disputes that arbitration clauses may encompass is not confined to claims
concerning the contract itself-those most naturally seen as controversies "arising out of' the contract within the meaning of the § 2
command. Arbitration clauses also may encompass claims under public laws overlaid on the contractual relationship.9 6 As a result, arbitration may encompass claims under antidiscrimination law for
employment contracts, 97 securities law for contracts concerning the
sale of stock,98 and antitrust law for business contracts, 9 9 among other
examples from the Court's decisions.
The FAA validates these reallocations of claims from the public to
the private sphere, as long as they are not transformative in a particular sense: "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." 10 0 Arbitration clauses are, "in effect, a specialized kind of forum selection
clause" in private contracts. 0 1 As the Court put the point most
recently: "The decision to resolve [age discrimination in employment]
claims by way of arbitration instead of litigation does not waive the

statute that directs courts to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), Aug. 26-Dec. 31, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-202.
As discussed below, the New York Convention nonetheless has influenced the Court's
understanding of arbitration in the U.S. domestic sphere, in which arbitration agreements within § 2 extend beyond the commercial setting. See infra Part II.B.
95 Moses H. Cone Mem'i Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25

(1983).
96 For criticism of this development, see Markovits, supra note 39, at 480-81.
97 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
98 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
99 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616
(1985).
100 Id. at 628.
101 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519. On the transnational dimension of the comparison to
forum-selection clauses, see infra note 120.
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statutory right to be free from workplace age discrimination; it waives
10 2
only the right to seek relief from a court in the first instance."
The now-extensive body of Court decisions along the foregoing
0
lines has met largely with consternation in scholarly commentary1 3
This Part offers a different account. When situated alongside the
Hanna doctrine, the Court's rhetoric on the types of civil claims arbitrable under the FAA starts to sound curiously familiar. Commenting
on Hanna within its own domain, John Hart Ely remarked that
"shadows on cave walls have a way of shifting.1 10 4 By this, Ely sought to
capture the Court's efforts to refine and circumscribe the potential
reach of the Erie doctrine in subsequent decisions, of which Hanna is
arguably the most significant. The shadows have become long indeed.
In effect, there has emerged a Hanna-like quality to the Court's FAA
decisions. The allocation of civil claims to the private realm of arbitration holds sway, as long as that allocation is "rationally capable of classification"10 5 as a mere change of forum that leaves intact "substantive
10 6

rights."

Here, too, there is a Will Rogers quality to case outcomes. As to
the types of claims that may be allocated to arbitration, the modern
Court has never yet met an arbitration clause that it didn't like. This
was not always so in the Court's FAA decisions.10 7 But the modern
Court has cast aside its FAA decisions from the early decades of the
twentieth century as embodying a "timeworn 'mistrust of arbitration'
...as

a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substan-

tive law."' 0 8 Mistrust of arbitration has yielded to the view that "[t]he
right to ajudicial forum is not the nonwaivable 'substantive' right protected by" securities law, antidiscrimination law, and the like. 10 9
The shadows of Hanna for the FAA naturally prompt the question: What is the object that is casting those shadows in the arbitration
context? One source is apparent in the Court's decisions, but the
102 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 (2009) (citation omitted).
The Court's distinction here resembles the contrast drawn in tort theory between
primary rights (for example, to be free from negligently caused injury) and secondary
rights (to sue the tortfeasor in the event of such injury). SeeJules L. Coleman, Tort
Law and the Demands of CorrectiveJustice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 367 (1992).
103 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
104 Ely, supra note 82, at 696.
105 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
106 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
107 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953) (holding claims under the Securities Act of 1933 not arbitrable).
108 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 1470 (2009).
109 Id. at 1464 n.5.
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other is less so. The first source consists of the recognition that the
FAA is no less of a public law than those that confer other sorts of
rights. The decisions that confirm the arbitrability of public law
claims address a question of statutory interpretation: whether the substantive rights afforded by public law stand apart from the statutorily
specified process for their assertion by way of litigation. By its nature,
this question calls for an answer in categorical terms of whether arbitration is inherently at odds with the substantive rights in a given
underlying statute, such as to support an inference that the prescribed
litigation process is the exclusive mode for dispute resolution.
In answering "no" to this question in a long-running string of
decisions, the Court reminds us that the validation of arbitration contracts under the command of FAA § 2 is itself a statutory matter-one
that Congress is free to turn off for a given public law by specifically
proscribing arbitration of the relevant claims.1 10 Like implied repeals
of statutes generally, implied repeals of the FAA are disfavored, such
that the inclusion of a private right of action in another statute-even
an unwaivable right l 1 -will not operate to displace the FAA. Arbitration in and of itself will not amount to a prohibited waiver.
Still, seen strictly in public-versus-private terms, the disinclination
toward implied repeals of the FAA gives rise to an odd institutional
implication. As noted earlier, the Hanna doctrine reposes trust in the
rulemaking process of the Rules Enabling Act, such that its products
govern the federal courts, with their real-world effects on claiming
consistently deemed to be incidental. 112 Yet this Hanna-like quality to
the Court's FAAjurisprudence initially seems inapt, because it effectively affords to private contracting a sweep and legal authority to reallocate civil claims that are tantamount to duly promulgated Federal
Rules. But private contracts do not go through anything like the
Rules Enabling Act process.
110 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). Illustrative statutes operate in a hodgepodge of contexts. See 7 U.S.C. § 197c(a) (2006 &
Supp. II 2009) (livestock and poultry contracts); 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2006) (consumer credit contracts for military personnel); 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2) (2006) (motor
vehicle franchise contracts); see also Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409, 3454-55 (2009) (prohibiting use of

appropriated funds for defense contracts in excess of one million dollars, unless contractor agrees neither to enter into nor to enforce arbitration agreements with
employees regarding employment discrimination and torts "related to or arising out
of sexual assault or harassment").
111 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C) (2006) (prohibiting advance waiver of"rights
or claims" under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
112 See sup-a note 36 and accompanying text.
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The Hanna-like quality of private contracts under the FAA takes
on a different cast when one probes deeper into the origins of the
Court's approach. There is more going on here than just disinclination toward implied repeals of statutes or, worse, a raw preference for
privatization of civil disputes. The way that one reads the FAA implicates not only the line between public and private realms in the
domestic sphere but also the authority of U.S. law-both U.S. procedure and U.S. conceptions of substantive rights-vis-A-vis the world.
Simply by the terms of the statute, the validation of arbitration
clauses under FAA § 2 extends to "a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce."' 13 The term "commerce," in turn, "means commerce among the several States or with foreign nations."' 1 4 This language is far from accidental. It replicates the phrasing of the
Commerce Clause in Article I of the Constitution, which empowers
the federal Congress to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
115
among the several states."
There is more to the connection between domestic and international commerce than just statutory language, however. The refer113 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
114 Id. § 1.
115 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. At the time that the FAA was enacted in 1925, the
understanding of the Commerce Clause had yet to undergo its transformation into a
wide-ranging source of federal regulatory authority. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
17 (2005) (reaffirming the approach to the Commerce Clause in Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942)). For criticism of this view, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING
THE LOST CONSTITUTION ch. 11

(2004).

The more circumscribed conception of commerce amenable to federal regulation circa 1925 places in context the oft-made observation that congressional debate
over the FAA focused on the commercial setting, rather than consumer or employment contracts. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV.
33, 78. The tenor of the debate in this respect is consonant with the pre-New Deal
conception of the Commerce Clause. For a more detailed account of the FAA along
similar lines, see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the
Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 127-30
(2002).
In moving from businesses to consumers, the Court applies to the FAA phrase
.commerce among the states" the same meaning as under its modern Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275
(1995) (noting that the scope of the FAA "expand[s] along with the expansion of the
Commerce Clause power itself," even though "[t]he pre-New Deal Congress that
passed the Act in 1925 might well have thought the Commerce Clause did not stretch
as far as has turned out to be the case"). To say otherwise now would be to revive a
miniature FAA version of the dreaded "Constitution in Exile." Cf Jeffrey Rosen, The
Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 17, 2005, at 42 (discussing the increasingly
active conservative movement known as the "Constitution in Exile" movement).
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ence to international commerce in the FAA is consonant with the
observation that contracting parties may choose to provide not merely
for arbitration but, more specifically, for arbitration pursuant to the
FAA. The arbitration clause in Stolt-Nielsen took such a form' 16 -what
commentators aptly describe as a facet of the larger "law market,"
whereby private contracts may select among competing national legal
regimes with regard to the mode for dispute resolution, the choice of
forum for disputes, and the choice of substantive law. 1 17 As a result,
cases concerning the command of FAA § 2-cases on the types of
claims amenable to arbitration thereunder-have transnational implications, even aside from the terms of the statute itself.
Recognition of the international dimension of the FAA and its
linkage to the domestic sphere under that statute, together, explain
the Court's path away from its previous "timeworn 'mistrust of the
arbitral process."' 1 18 The Court decisions that initiated this shift,
beginning in the 1970s, involved not domestic transactions but,
instead, international commerce." 9 In the international setting, a
need for specification arises as to a whole host of matters that contracts in the domestic sphere easily might leave open: which nation's
law shall govern disputes, where claiming may ensue, what procedures
116 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 (2010).
117 See ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 3-17 (2009).
118 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1470 (2009) (quoting Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231 (1987) (referencing the holding in
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953))).
119 Taking the first step along this path in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
(1974), the Court dealt with arbitration of claims under U.S. securities law arising
from the acquisition by a U.S. company of various European business entities. Id. at
508-09. Decades earlier, the Court had invalidated an agreement to arbitrate claims
under U.S. securities law of the sort in Scherk. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438
(1953). The Scherk Court confined those suspicions to the domestic context in which
they had arisen, explaining that the international sphere "involves considerations and
policies significantly different." Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515. The Court described the difference in terms of the greater need for private ordering-particularly, over choice of

law and the forum for dispute resolution-as "an almost indispensible precondition
to the achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction." Id. at 516.
The Court returned to the same theme when addressing antitrust claims arising
from a franchise contract between a Japanese automaker and a Puerto Rican distributor. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
616-17 (1985). The Court again pointed to "the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes" as among the considera-

tions that favored enforcement of the arbitration agreement, "even assuming that a
contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context." Id. at 629.
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may be used, and how any resulting resolutions (by courtjudgment or
arbitral award) are to be treated.
This is not to suggest that U.S. domestic law has completely
worked out answers to these questions in the absence of contractual
specification. Questions concerning conflicts of law, jurisdiction and
venue, Erie and Hanna, and the treatment of judgments across different domestic court systems remain fixtures of the law school curriculum. But at least the domestic realm has a decently elaborated body
of doctrine on such matters, such that contracting parties need not
necessarily come up with their own. And, perhaps even more importantly, there is a single court with well-established authority to resolves
disputes among different domestic jurisdictions and their respective
court systems.
The international sphere does not bear the same descriptionnot at the time that the Court embarked on its rethinking of the FAA
and, to a fair degree, even today. Chronology is telling here. The
change in the Court's view of arbitration as of the 1970s followed
upon greater Court receptiveness to international forum selection
clauses in litigation. 120 Here, developments in litigation and arbitration intertwine. Even more tellingly, the Court's shift away from distrust of arbitration with regard to federal statutory rights gathered
momentum well before the emergence of guidance from the Court
itself concerning the extraterritorial reach of those same statutes in
the early 1990s. 121 The sorting out of the international sphere by private contract thus precedes by decades its sorting out via principles of
statutory interpretation as to extraterritoriality. If anything, the sorting out of extraterritoriality continues to the present day. During the
same Term as Shady Grove and Stolt-Nielsen, the Court at long last
resolved the applicability of U.S. securities law to f-cubed situations:
those involving foreign investors suing a foreign issuer with respect to
shares sold on a foreign exchange. 12 2 In the course of its opinion, the
Court went so far as to deem 'justified" the criticism that lower court
120 See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1972). In deeming arbitrable the securities claims in Scherk, the Court emphasized the enforcement of the
choice-of-forum agreement in Bremen. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519. The Court later
would extend the same receptiveness to choice-of-forum provisions in adhesive contracts. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991).
121 See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246-47 (1991) (holding that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply extraterritorially to regulate
employment abroad of U.S. citizens by U.S. firms); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2004) (analyzing extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act in light of limitation in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act).
122 See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (holding
that § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 reaches fraud "only in con-
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decisions on the topic from decades past had yielded "unpredictable
1 23
and inconsistent" guidance.
Apart from the debate over extraterritoriality, standards for the
recognition and enforcement of judgments across nations remain in

flux. 1 24 An important treatment of the topic by the American Law

Institute (ALI) was completed only in 2006,125 and efforts at an interI2 6
national treaty on the subject have proven unavailing.
On its own terms, the Hanna doctrine speaks to the allocation of
governing authority as between an applicable Federal Rule and conflicting state law. But the choice remains one between competing
rules duly adopted by different sovereigns. Recognition of the international dimension to the Court's FAA jurisprudence, if anything,
casts its Hanna-like qualities in a light more favorable than the "hardhearted" 12 7 dominance of the Federal Rules observed in Hanna's own
domain.
As to international contracts, the choice is not so much one
between regimes of governance, each set by a different sovereign.
Rather, the choice lies between governance through private ordering
by contract, on the one hand, and formidable uncertainty in the
absence of such ordering. The source of uncertainty consists of the
still-fledgling elaboration of transnational doctrines concerning extraterritoriality, judgment recognition and enforcement, and the like. In
embarking on its endorsement of private governance for public law
claims in 1974, the Court underscored the concern that "the dicey
atmosphere of.

.

.a legal no-man's-land would surely damage the

fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingnection with the purchase or sale of a security on an American stock exchange, and
the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States").
123 Id. at 2880-81.
124 On the wide variety of approaches to judgment recognition and enforcement

questions from a comparative perspective, see Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational
Class Actions and InterjurisdictionalPreclusion,86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311 (2011). Principles of "full faith and credit" that organize such questions in the U.S. domestic
sphere do not obtain internationally. See id. at 369-75.
125 See AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (2006). The ALI proposal builds on European developments, spurred by a 2000 European Union regulation on judgment recognition and enforcement. See Council Regulation 44/2001, on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2000
OJ. (L 12) 1.
126 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REv. 173, 182-83 (2008) (describing the "impasse" over the treaty).
127 Ely, supra note 82, at 697 (noting the argument that Hanna gives a hardhearted "rendition" of Erie because "any federal rule... that is even arguably procedural is to be applied ... ,state law to the contrary notwithstanding").
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ness and ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements." 128 To be sure, the Court's rhetoric is an
overstatement today, as the law has made a start toward working out
questions surrounding the transnational dimensions of litigation. Noman's land has begun to have some road signs.
That arbitration should have seemed a desirable alternative to a
"legal no-man's-land" in the mid-1970s, nonetheless, is no historical
accident. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (commonly known as the New York Convention) had entered into force in the United States in 1970.129 No counterpart international regime for the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in litigation exists even today, 130 a point of contrast with
arbitration that lends context to the Court's championing of the latter
13 1
as a source of governance for a globalized world of commerce.
With its endorsement of arbitration for public law claims on the
books for international contracts, the Court then extended the same
notion to the domestic realm-ultimately disavowing its early-twentieth-century skepticism of arbitration in that setting. 132 To be sure, the
international sphere is not the domestic sphere. But the encompassing of the two in the same term-"commerce," as defined in the
FAA133-counsels against differentiation. As a practical matter, moreover, a two-tiered FAA regime for contracts divided along foreign-versus-domestic lines is increasingly untenable in the age of globalization
that pervasively blurs the line between the two. Commentators add
the further observation that, "[o] nce international parties get the benefits of arbitration," there remains "little reason to hamper the ability
of domestic parties, which might be competing with international par1 34
ties in world markets, to obtain the same benefits."
On this account, the sweep afforded by the modern Court's FAA
decisions on the types of rights that arbitration may encompass
reflects not so much a sense of hubris about private contracting in
128 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974).
129 See New York Convention, supra note 94; see also Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15
(noting the entry into force in U.S. law of the New York Convention in 1970 as among
the "international developments and domestic legislation in the area of commercial
arbitration subsequent to" Wilko).
130 See supranote 126 and accompanying text (citing article discussing the lack of
such a treaty).
131 See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 117, at 95-96.
132 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) (expressly overruling Wilko).
133 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (providing the definition of "commerce" under the FAA).
134 O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 117, at 102.
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preference to public law but, rather, a well-taken sense of humility
about the capacity of U.S. law-in both its procedural and substantive
forms-to govern an interconnected globe. The Court's FAA decisions effectively say that one cannot have such humility for international commerce without also applying the same principles to
domestic commerce when the FAA itself and the broader forces of
globalization have rolled the two into one. As the next subpart
reveals, awareness of the transnational dimension of the FAA casts in a
new light the Court's decision in Stolt-Nielsen about what arbitrators
may infer from contractual silence.
B. Explaining Stolt-Nielsen
Read strictly in public-versus-private terms, the reasoning in StoltNielsen is puzzling. The Court deems arbitrators to lack authority to
pursue class arbitration, even though the underlying claims there
13 5
If
were such as to make a class action in litigation readily available.
ever there were a situation in which arbitration would appear to make
for a mere change of forum-from class action to class arbitrationthen Stolt-Nielsen would seem to be it.
The dispute in Stolt-Nielsen arose after a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) criminal investigation had revealed a price-fixing conspiracy among shipping companies that operate "seagoing vessels with
compartments that are separately chartered to customers wishing to
ship liquids in small quantities." 136 For all the controversy surrounding class actions generally, their certification in antitrust cases has
become relatively routine.137 If anything, such claims present a paradigm scenario for class treatment, as they characteristically present
such small stakes as to be unviable individually yet often call for the
incurring of high fixed costs for the development of expert economic
analysis. 138 Though the DOJ criminal investigation may have eased
135

See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010)

("[Where there is] 'no agreement' on this question .... parties cannot be compelled
to submit their dispute to class arbitration.").
136 Id. at 1764.
137 See Am. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.01
cmt. c, at 78 (2010) (noting the relative ease of class certification for claims of
"upstream" economic injuries focused on market misconduct of the defendant, as in
many antitrust class actions). I served as one of the Associate Reporters for this
project.
138 Lower court decisions concerning class waivers in arbitration clauses underscore these economic dimensions for the plaintiffs' side. See, e.g., Italian Colors Rest.
v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. (In reAm. Express Merchs.' Litig.), 554 F.3d 300,
316-17 (2d Cir. 2009) (alleged unlawful tying arrangement), cert. granted, vacated, and
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the burden of the latter for the Stolt-Nielsen plaintiffs, 13 9 class counsel
noted that the "vast majority" of their claims remained unviable
140
individually.
With class certification in litigation likely, the notion that arbitration might proceed on a class basis would not seem such a dramatic
development at first glance. As the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) noted in its amicus brief, the rules that the AAA has drafted in
recent years for use in class arbitration "largely track the provisions of
Rule 23" 14 1-including its opt-out mechanism. 142 To have class arbitration along Rule 23-like lines rather than a class action under that
Rule thus would seem a straightforward change of forum alone. Yet,
in Stolt-Nielsen, this similarity is not a basis for comfort but, instead, the
source of the problem. The reason why enables one to locate the
holding in Stolt-Nielsen within the Court's FAA jurisprudence.
The Court starts from the recognition in its own FAA precedents
that arbitrators have gap-filling authority to resolve "'procedural'
remanded sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010);
Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 58 (1st Cir. 2006) (alleged price-fixing
conspiracy).
139 See Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco,
and the Mixing of Public and PrivateLauyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1,
2 (2000) (noting the economic attractiveness for private class actions to ride on the
coattails of a public enforcement action).
140 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1770 n.7 (quoting Joint Appendix at 82a-83a, StoltNielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (No. 08-1198) (excerpting the record of the arbitration
panel)).
141 Brief of American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 17, Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (No. 08-1198). The Court noted,
however, that the AAA developed its rules for class arbitration after the shipment
contracts at issue in Stolt-Nielsen had been drafted. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768
n.4. The AAA rules themselves arose in the aftermath of the Court's own inconclusive
opinion in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003), which left
open whether class arbitration is permissible under an arbitration clause that is silent
as to class treatment-that is, the question that the Court granted review in StoltNielsen to resolve. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764.
142 The AAA rules provide that "[tihe Class Determination Award shall state when
and how members of the class may be excluded from the class arbitration." Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations,AM. ARB. ASS'N, at R. 5(c), http://www.adr.org/sp.
asp?id=21936 (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). The opportunity to request exclusion need
not be provided in "exceptional circumstance[s]," as for "claims seeking injunctive
relief or claims to a limited fund." Id. In this regard, the AAA rules replicate the
distinction in class action law between opt-out classes for damages and mandatory
classes for "indivisible" relief, with injunctions, declaratory judgments, and damages
from a limited fund comprising illustrations of the latter. See Am.LAW INsT., supra
note 137, § 2.07(c) & cmts. h-i.
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questions." 143 This authority applies to contracts under the FAA the

general principle that, "[w]hen the parties to a bargain sufficiently
defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which
is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which
is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court."', 44 In this
regard, arbitrators may do in arbitration what a court may do in contract litigation.
The Court then proceeds to catalogue the "fundamental
changes" that class arbitration would bring, ultimately characterizing
the "differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration" as "too
great" to lie within the gap-filling power of the arbitrators as to procedural matters. 145 The upshot of Stolt-Nielsen is that some matters that
we might label as procedural elsewhere endanger the underlying
agreement to arbitrate in the first place. But the Court does not
explain why the claim-enabling effect of the class mechanism-it
"adjudicates the rights of absent parties" beyond those already at
hand 146 -is game changing for arbitration but merely incidental in
1 47
litigation, per Shady Grove.
Here is where the deep symmetry between the international and
domestic contexts in the Court's FAA jurisprudence yields the explanation that the Stolt-Nielsen opinion fails to provide. U.S.-style class
actions are far from anomalous in the domestic setting of concern for
the Erie and Hanna doctrines. 148 But U.S.-style class actions-in par143

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,

537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002)).
144 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 204 (1979)).
145 Id. at 1776.
146 Id. The main thrust of the differences catalogued by the Court concerns the
encompassing of absent parties. To be fair, however, the Court does add a related
point at the end of its list of differences: "[T]he commercial stakes of class-action
arbitration are comparable to those of class-action litigation, even though the scope
of judicial review is much more limited." Id. (citations omitted). The reference
appears to be to judicial review on the merits, given the Stolt-Nielsen Court's citation to
Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008), on that subject. It is not
clear, however, how weighty the difference in scope of review on the merits actually is
for the question of what arbitrators may do in the face of contractual silence as to
class treatment. As to both class actions and class arbitrations, the occasions for
review of a class-wide determination of the merits are rare due to the predominance
of settlements over trials in both domains.
147 See supranotes 13-19 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Shady

Grove).
148 The substantial majority of states either replicate Rule 23 in their respective
class action rules or at least look to federal precedents concerning Rule 23 to inform
interpretation of the state counterpart. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., State and Foreign

1102

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 86:3

ticular, class actions in their most common domestic form of an optout process-are considerably more anomalous within the broader
landscape of global regimes for civil disputes.149 The point goes
beyond concern about the defendant having to face a unitary, all-themarbles proceeding. The much larger stumbling block for the notion
of an opt-out class proceeding in comparative law terms consists of the
steadfast refusal of many nations-especially, those in the civil law tradition-to countenance the disposition of claimants' rights without
1
their affirmative consent.

50

Disinclination on this score is no minor quibble across nations.
When considering whether U.S.-style class actions may encompass
class members abroad, U.S. courts have identified other Western
industrialized nations that would regard those proceedings as presenting such a fundamental affront as to warrant a refusal to recognize a
resulting U.S. class judgment. 151 Here, too, as in the Court's early
expansions of the arbitral domain from the 1970s forward, considerations of judgment recognition and enforcement in litigation shed
1 52
light on the Court's approach to the FAA.
What is "fundamental" to arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen is that which
would impede judgment recognition and enforcement in litigation
across the international sphere. Again, the point here is not to treat
Class-Action Rules and Statutes: Differences from-and Lessons for?-FederalRule 23, 35 W.
ST. U. L. REV. 147, 147-48 (2007).

149 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 298-304 (2010); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across
the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1, 20-25 (2009)
(highlighting the "exceptionalism of U.S.-style class actions within the realm of aggregate litigation").
150 See Coffee, supra note 149, at 302 ("In contrast to the coolness shown by U.S.
courts to the concept of the opt-in class action, Europe has been reluctant to accept
any collective litigation remedy that does not require individual consent by class
members.").
The United Kingdom, the common law nation with the deepest historical ties to
the United States, notably declined a recent recommendation from its Civil Justice
Council to adopt an opt-out class mechanism. See U.K. MINISTRY OJUSTICE, THE GoVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL'S REPORT: 'IMPROVING AccEsS TO

AcTIONS' 11 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov.
uk/publications/dcs/gvernment-respnse-cjc-collective-actions.pdf.
151 See In reAlstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 266, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("A French
court would likely conclude that any judgment rendered by this Court involving
absent French class members offends public policy because absent French investors
did not consent. .. ."); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76, 102
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he class action model is not so contrary to French public policy

JUSTICE THROUGH COLLECrIvE

152

See supra Part II.A.
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differently domestic and international contracts that contain arbitration clauses but, rather, to recognize that the interpretive principles
for such clauses-in particular, what silence on a given matter empowers arbitrators to do-should be selected with an eye toward smooth
operation in both spheres.
Stolt-Nielsen holds that silence as to class treatment in arbitration
does not amount to an agreement to such treatment and, therefore,
that arbitrators lack authority so to proceed. 153 The holding in StoltNielsen effectively eases what otherwise would be potential for tension
between the obligation of other nations to recognize and enforce arbitral awards under the New York Convention and the principles that
those same nations would use to recognize and enforce judgments in
litigation.' 54 In both domains, obligations of recognition and enforcement remain conditioned upon the "public policy" of the would-be
recognizing nation. 55 The resulting similarity as to matters of recognition and enforcement carries forward the broader notion of arbitra153 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct 1758, 1776 (2010).
154 See New York Convention, supra note 94, art. III ("Each Contracting State shall
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid
down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or
enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.").
155 Compare id. art. V(2) (b) (espousing a public policy exception to recognition
and enforcement of awards in international commercial arbitration), with Am. LAw
INST., supra note 125, § 5 cmt. h, at 62-63 (noting inclusion of a public policy exception "in every statute or treaty the world over concerned with recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments or arbitral awards").
The status of the New York Convention as a treaty, nonetheless, may make it
more difficult as a practical matter for a given nation to invoke the public policy
exception in the arbitration context, as distinct from judgment recognition, which is
not presently covered by an international treaty. Writing prior to Stolt-Nielsen, one
commentator suggested that class arbitration pursued in the face of contractual
silence might give rise to enforceable awards under the New York Convention in some
situations. See S.I. Strong, The Sounds of Silence: Are US. ArbitratorsCreating Internationally Enforceable Awards When Ordering Class Arbitration in Cases of ContractualSilence or
Ambiguity?, 30 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1083-91 (2009); see also S.I. Strong, Enforcing
Class Arbitrationin the InternationalSphere: Due Process and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U.
PA. J. Irr'L L. 1, 91-95 (2008) (arguing that class arbitration should encounter no

"blanket" prohibition under the New York Convention). Strong readily acknowledges, however, the resistance of civil-law nations to representative actions in the
nature of opt-out proceedings. See id. at 23. In focusing on arbitration law, moreover,
her argument understandably does not take account of the skepticism about judgment recognition and enforcement with regard to U.S.-style class actions in Alstom
and Vivendi specifically. See cases cited supra note 151.
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tion and litigation as interchangeable fora for civil disputes. The
same point also operates to cabin the reach of Stolt-Nielsen, such that it
does not open up the gamut of mundane "procedural" determinations by arbitrators as grounds on which to resist enforcement of arbitral awards.

15 6

In short, awareness of the international perspective that started
the Court on its modern FAA jurisprudence decades ago supplies the
missing explanation for the holding in Stolt-Nielsen. More broadly, this
view of Stolt-Nielsen explains why the claim-enabling effect of class
treatment makes for a fundamental change in arbitration but for
something that is merely incidental doctrine in litigation. Yet this is
not to say that all is entirely well in the Court's FAA jurisprudence.
The next step for the Court after Stolt-Nielsen concerns contractual agreements to arbitrate that are not silent as to the class mechanism but, instead, purport to waive its use in both arbitration and
litigation. As the next Part explains, this scenario presents an occasion for refinement of the Court's FAA jurisprudence in a manner
that, once more, benefits from juxtaposition with the treatment of the
Erie and Hanna doctrines in Shady Grove.
III.

CLASS

WAIVERS IN ARBITRATION

The debate over class waivers presents the Court with a body of
lower court decisions in recent years that take anything but a deferential, Hanna-like view of what arbitration clauses may do. The trend
has been decidedly the opposite, with a spate of decisions from federal appellate courts and state supreme courts invalidating class waivers. 157 By its terms, FAA § 2 qualifies its validation of contractual
agreements to arbitrate by reference to "such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract."'158 In a nutshell, the
156 I am grateful to Peter Rutledge for underscoring the importance of cabining
the interpretation of Stolt-Nielsen in this regard.
157 See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, vacated, and remanded sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130
S. Ct. 2401 (2010); Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 986
(9th Cir. 2007); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1217 (11th Cir. 2007); Kristian
v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 60 (1st Cir. 2006); Discover Bank v. Superior Court,
113 P.3d 1110 (Cal. 2005); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 278 (Ill.
2006); Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 90 (N.J.

2006).
158 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Again, I speak here of arbitration not governed by treaty.
For treaty-governed arbitration, the question is whether the arbitration agreement is
"null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." New York Convention,
supra note 94, art. 11(3). The "null and void" category "encompass[es] only those
situations-such as fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver-that can be applied neutrally
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caveat in § 2 preserves "generally applicable contract defenses" under
state law. 1 59 The focal point for debate over the validity of class waivers has consisted-at least nominally-of state unconscionability
doctrine.
The first subpart of this Part begins by framing the controversy
over class waivers by comparison to the previous treatment of StoltNielsen. The Court's decision in Stolt-Nielsen that silence in an arbitration clause does not permit the use of class arbitration understandably
garners attention with regard to class waivers. This subpart explains
why Stolt-Nielsen, properly read, does not predetermine the legitimacy
of class waivers. Interestingly enough, the reason why harks back to
the line between the kind of formalistic, categorical analysis reflected
in both the Hanna doctrine and its FAA counterpart, on the one
hand, and the more functional analysis prescribed by the Erie doctrine, on the other hand. Simply put, the lower court decisions on
class waivers seek to introduce a more functional mode of analysis
focused on the real-world impact of those waivers. In this regard, one
might say that the lower courts seek to cabin what otherwise would be
an overextension of the Court's Hanna-like approach to the FAA, in
much the same way that Hanna itself conversely addressed the potential overreach of the Erie doctrine.
The second subpart then speaks to the particular case-AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 16 0-that the Court has selected for its first
foray into the debate over class waivers. Concepcion notably does not
present the Court with an arbitration clause that contains a class
waiver alone. Rather, the clause at issue also provides a contingent
bonus for both the claimant and her counsel in the event that the
claimant fares better in arbitration than under the last pre-arbitration
settlement offer she received.1 6 1 This subpart explains why the particulars of the lower court decisions under review in Concepcion call for
Supreme Court application of its FAA counterpart of the Hannadoctrine, not the FAA version of Erie-unlike for many other situations
on an international scale." Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir.
1982); accord Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 959-60
(10th Cir. 1992); Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e Rias-

sicurazoni v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 53 (3d Cir. 1983). The category of "null and void"

contracts does not encompass "parochial interests of the nation," Ledee, 684 F.2d at
187, a description that might include the unconscionability defense in domestic contract law.
159 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
160 Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub
nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010).

161

See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
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involving class waiver provisions. As in Shady Grove for litigation, the
reasoning of the lower courts in Concepcion miscategorizes as an Erietype question what is actually a Hanna-type situation under the FAA.
As such, Shady Grove-not Stolt-Nielsen-is the crucial guide among the
Court's precedents with regard to its forthcoming decision in Concepcion. This second subpart then steps back from doctrine to reflect
more broadly on the questions of institutional design presented for
litigation and arbitration in the future.
A.

An Erie Doctrinefor (Most) Class Waivers

Just as all provisions for statutory damages are not alike, so, too,
do arbitration clauses vary. The Court's FAA precedents have focused
to date on what one might describe as first-generation arbitration
clauses-that is, contractual provisions that simply oblige the parties
to arbitrate rather than litigate disputes, with no discussion of class
treatment. Stolt-Nielsen concerned such a first-generation clause. Second-generation arbitration clauses fill the silence in first-generation
clauses by adding class waivers. 162 And third-generation clauses, in
turn, attempt to respond in various ways to the lower-court invalidations of second-generation clauses. In moving from Stolt-Nielsen to
Concepcion in successive terms, the Court effectively leapfrogs from
first- to third-generation arbitration clauses. This move seems one of
conscious choice, as the Court has bypassed numerous opportunities
163
to opine on class waivers in second-generation clauses.
With Stolt-Nielsen now decided, an understandable temptation
arises to regard it as having predetermined the validity of both secondand third-generation arbitration clauses. The logic of such a view is
alluring: if silence effectively operates as a waiver of class arbitration,
then surely an express waiver, too, must operate as a waiver.
As explained in the first section that follows, the peculiar posture
in which Stolt-Nielsen came to the Court counsels against the acceptance of such tempting logic. The attention devoted here to the pos162 The distinction here between first- and second-generation arbitration clauses
draws on Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial
Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal
Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 477, 503-09 (2009).
163 Shortly after deciding Stolt-Nielsen, the Court granted the writ of certiorari, but
simply to vacate thejudgment and remand, in a case from the Second Circuit involving a second-generation arbitration clause. See In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 554
F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded sub nom. Am. Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). For examples of certiorari denials in
other cases involving second-generation clauses, see Respondents' Brief in Opposition
at 1, Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (No. 09-893).
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ture of Stolt-Nielsen so as to understand its proper reach stands as the
counterpart to the discussion earlier about how the odd posture of
Shady Grove influenced the framing of the issue there. 16 4 Speaking
more broadly, the second section explains how the debate over class
waivers presents the Court with a dispute different in kind from those
that the vast majority of its FAA decisions have engaged. Clear demarcation of the class waiver question, in turn, helps to explain why the
lower court decisions on that subject have taken a different and less
deferential tack-one that benefits from consideration in light of the
distinction between the Hanna and the Erie doctrines in litigation.
1. The Too-Easy Inference from Stolt-Nielsen
Simply put, there was no issue in Stolt-Nielsen concerning the obligation to arbitrate. In particular, the question there was not whether
a move from litigation to arbitration would exculpate the defendants
as a practical matter. Upon the filing of a class action complaint in
litigation, the Second Circuit had concluded that the antitrust pricefixing claims on the merits in Stolt-Nielsen were subject to arbitration
by the terms of the underlying shipping contracts. 165 In particular,
the Second Circuit noted that it "d[id] not understand [the would-be
plaintiff class] to be making any argument to the effect that its assertion of class claims should serve as a bar or deterrent to sending the
instant case to an arbitral panel."' 66 The notion of class treatment as
something that somehow was necessary to prevent the arbitration
1 67
clause from being unconscionable simply was not before the court.
164 See supra Part I.A.2.
165 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1757, 1765 (citing
JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 387 F.3d 163, 183 (2d Cir. 2004)).
166 JLM Indus., Inc., 387 F.3d at 180 n.9.
167 The closest that the would-be plaintiff class came to such a contention was in a
suggestion that "marketwide horizontal" price-fixing conspiracies differ categorically
in terms of their complexity from "vertical" ones involving "a manufacturer and its
distributor." Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 13, JLM Indus., Inc., 387 F.3d 163 (No.
03-7683). Urging such a distinction, plaintiffs contended that "to require individual
arbitration by each of the 500 to 700 customers [in a horizontal price-fixing case]
would so splinter the incentive to sue, and would so burden the claimants with duplicative burdens and expenses, that it inevitably would frustrate important interests of
United States antitrust law in both compensation and deterrence." JLM Indus. Inc.,
387 F.3d at 180 (quoting Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra,at 26-27). The Second
Circuit declined to distinguish between horizontal and vertical price-fixing on
grounds of complexity, noting that the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. had concluded that "the factor of potential complexity alone
does not persuade us that an arbitral tribunal could not properly handle an antitrust
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In light of the Second Circuit's decision, the contending sides
then "agree [d] that . . . AnimalFeeds and [the defendant shipping
companies] must arbitrate their antitrust dispute. ' 168 At that point,
the question became whether the arbitration proceeding could take a
class-wide form, as AnimalFeeds sought, with the contending sides
stipulating that "the arbitration clause was 'silent' with respect to class
arbitration" in the sense of evidencing "no agreement . . . on that

issue." 169 Stolt-Nielsen thus came to the Supreme Court not for review
of the Second Circuit's recognition of an obligation to arbitrate but,
instead, later in the sequence of events-in what Justice Ginsburg, in
dissent, accurately described as "an abstract and highly interlocutory"
posture. 170
The arbitration award under review in Stolt-Nielsen neither disposed of the merits on a class-wide basis nor spoke to any allegation of
unconscionability, I 71 just as the lower courts in Shady Grove had not
actually ruled on the class certification question there) 72 The arbitration award consisted simply of the intermediate conclusion that
silence permitted the arbitrators to inquire, at some later point, into
whether class arbitration would be suitable for the antitrust dispute on
173
practical grounds.
Because of the supposition all around as to the existence of an
obligation to arbitrate, one may not properly read Stolt-Nielsen as
resolving the circumstances under which such an obligation arises.
Stolt-Nielsen is a further permutation on the usual sort of case concerning the command in FAA § 2, not the caveat therein. It is precisely
the caveat in § 2 to which the usual sorts of challenges to class waivers
speak.1 74 As the next subsection explains, the lower court decisions
matter." Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 633-34 (1985)).
168 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765.
169 Id. at 1766 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170 Id. at 1778 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
171 In the absence of contractual specification, the unconscionability of an arbitra-

tion clause under FAA § 2 is a matter for judicial determination. See Rent-A-Center,
W., Inc. v.Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010). An arbitration clause, however, may

provide for a different institutional allocation of the unconscionability question by
calling for its initial consideration by the arbitrator, rather than a court. See id. at
2779.
172 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
173 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1777-78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

174 Under general contractual principles, a determination that a class waiver is
unconscionable would raise a further question about its severability from the arbitration clause in which it appears. See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2778-79. A contractual obligation to forego class treatment is distinct from a contractual obligation to
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that have emerged on class waivers in recent years highlight a need for
clarification in the Court's FAA jurisprudence along lines that resonate in the Hanna and Erie doctrines.
2.

Formalism and Functionalism Under the FAA

As the preceding Part has observed, the proposition that "a party
does not forgo [her] substantive rights" by agreeing "to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than ajudicial, forum"'1 75 has become something of a mantra in the Court's FAA decisions. The Court has
steadily expanded the types of civil claims that may be subject to arbitration, moving from disputes under the contract itself to disputes
176
In makunder public laws overlaid on the contractual relationship.
to
consider
occasion
had
ing these moves, the Court has only rarely
whether arbitration would make unviable the claims in question as a
practical matter.
The structure of FAA § 2 itself distinguishes questions about the
categories of claims that an arbitration clause may encompass from
questions about the practical viability of those claims in the arbitral

arbitrate. As a practical matter, however, the two obligations effectively merge into
one.
Unconscionability questions about class waivers arise via a well-trod series of
moves: Claimants file a conventional class action complaint in litigation, and the
defendant responds with a motion to compel arbitration under the terms of the contract-that is, one-on-one arbitration, given the class waiver. Upon a determination
that the class waiver is unconscionable, prudent courts do not leap to decide the severability question but, instead, afford the party that has filed the motion to compel
arbitration to withdraw that motion. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554
F.3d 300, 321 (2d Cir. 2009). At that point, now faced with the choice of a class action
in court and class arbitration, defendants' oft-noted move is to opt for the proverbial
devil-you-know: defense of a class action under the well elaborated strictures of civil
procedure, rather than defense of a class arbitration with parameters that are less well
understood. See Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 43, at 179. Indeed, some arbitration clauses state such a stance in advance by declaring the class waiver not to be
severable from the arbitration clause as a whole. SeeJack Wilson, "No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses," State Law Unconscionability, and the Federal Arbitration Act: A Case for
Federal JudicialRestraint and CongressionalAction, 23 QUINNIPiAc L. REv. 737, 779-80
(2004).
The consequence is that a determination whether a class waiver is unconscionable effectively operates as a determination whether there is an obligation to arbitrate
at all. As for contractual rights generally, invocation of an arbitration clause within a
contract is not compulsory. A defense withdrawal of the motion to compel arbitration
leaves no one in the position of making such an invocation and, hence, no obligation
capable of enforcement by a court. One is back to the world of litigation.
175 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
176 See supra Part II.A.
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forum. As suggested earlier, the first question calls for an exercise in
statutory interpretation to reconcile the validation of the arbitration
contract under the command of § 2 with the rights set forth in some
other statute. 1 77 The starting point, nonetheless, remains that the validation of the contract to arbitrate is indeed in play, such as to generate a need for reconciliation vis-a-vis other statutes.
Viewed in this light, Stolt-Nielsen is cut from the same cloth as the
succession of Court decisions that deem arbitrable claims under an
array of public laws.' 17 In both settings, the underlying obligation to
arbitrate under the command of FAA § 2 was operational, such that
the question then becomes whether some other statute somehow
turns off that command implicitly-or, for Stolt-Nielsen, the content of
that command, in the face of contractual silence about class
arbitration.
Cases on the interaction between the command of § 2 and some
other statute are not the same as cases concerning the caveat in § 2
itself. The starting point of most lower court decisions on class waivers
in arbitration clauses is precisely that the validation of those provisions
is in doubt, due to the § 2 caveat. The Supreme Court heretofore has
not directly engaged the § 2 caveat. The Court has come closest in its
2000 decision in Green Tree FinancialCorp.-Alabamav. Randolph.179 The
dispute in Green Tree did not stem from any purported categorical
incompatibility between arbitration and the public law claims
involved 8 0 but, rather, presented a more circumstantial concern.
Because arbitration is a private mode of dispute resolution, the
cost of running that decision making apparatus is not borne by the
public fisc, unlike the cost of judges and court personnel in conventional litigation. The first-generation arbitration clause in Green Tree
was silent as to who would bear the cost of arbitration. That feature,
in turn, had led the court of appeals to deem the arbitration clause
unenforceable out of fear that cost considerations might disable
claiming entirely.18 1 One may understand this concern as a kind of asapplied challenge to the arbitrability of the public-law claims in Green
Tree, as distinct from a facial challenge to their arbitrability of the sort
presented in the bulk of the Court's decisions under the command of
177 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussing arbitrable claims
under public laws).

179 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
180 See id. at 83 (noting claims under the Truth in Lending Act and Equal Credit
Opportunity Act).

181 See id. at 84 (noting that the lower court found the arbitration clause unenforceable because it was silent on payment of expenses).
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§ 2.182 In reversing, the Supreme Court eschewed a categorical
approach to the asserted cost barriers, looking instead to matters of
real-world functionality.
The Green Tree Court acknowledged that " [i] t may well be that the
existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant ... from
effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral
forum. '1 8 3 But, "where ...

a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration

agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively
expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of
incurring such costs.

' 18 4

For cost barriers to claiming, in short, the

answer does not call for statutory interpretation but,18 5rather, affirmative proof that goes beyond "speculative" assertions.
The lower court decisions invalidating class waivers in secondgeneration arbitration clauses proceed in keeping with the guidance
on cost-related barriers in Green Tree.18 6 This is fitting, for the crux of
the usual contention that class waivers are unconscionable under
applicable state contract law' 8 7 is a permutation of a cost-based argument-namely, that the underlying claims are economically viable
only in the aggregate, such that the class waiver functions as an exculpatory clause. Two observations bear attention in connection with
this cost-based thread of the unconscionability argument.
First, the unconscionability argument is consonant with the latitude afforded to state law by the § 2 caveat. In historical terms, the
overarching notion behind § 2 was "to replace judicial indisposition to
arbitration" of the sort prevalent in the early twentieth century.' 8 8 In
qualifying the validation of arbitration by reference to generally applicable contract defenses, the caveat in § 2 places arbitration contracts
182 I am grateful to Christopher Drahozal for suggesting this way to understand
Green Tree.
183 Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90.
184 Id. at 92. For empirical analysis of cost-based challenges to arbitration clauses
in the lower courts, see Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee
Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 729, 752-57 (2006).
185 Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90.
186 This is not to suggest that the lower court case law is uniform. Some courts
have deemed class waivers to be categorically valid on the ground that class treatment
is merely a matter of procedure. See, e.g., Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND, 693
N.W.2d 918, 926 (N.D. 2005) ("[L]imitation of use of a class action or class arbitration does not prohibit any substantive remedy. .. ").
187 A distinct line of questions surrounding class waivers concerns the identification of which body of state contract law governs the unconscionability question.
Some second-generation arbitration clauses couple class waivers with choice-of-law
clauses. For further discussion, see Nagareda, supra note 43, at 1907-09.
188 Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008).
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"on an equal footing with other contracts"'- 8 9-no

less valid, but also

no more.
The attention devoted to cost barriers in functional terms connects the lower court decisions on the unconscionability of class waivers in arbitration to longstanding rejections of exculpatory clauses in
contracts generally-say, an advance agreement to waive any claim for
negligence as a condition for admittance to a hospital.' 9 0 This recognition of the critical connection to exculpatory clauses in contracts
generally coheres with the "equal footing" perspective prescribed by
the § 2 caveat. At the very least, if a court could not properly find
unconscionable a class waiver, in a contract without an arbitration
clause, then so, too, should that court not find the same waiver unconscionable in a contract with an arbitration clause.1 9 ' To anticipate the
discussion to come in the next subpart, the misstep described here is
precisely the one implicated in Concepcion.
Second, the state law basis for the § 2 caveat reveals a deeper connection between the Court's FAA jurisprudence and the previous discussion of the Hanna and Erie doctrines that govern federal-state
relations in litigation.1 92 At the outset, one must take care not to overplay the connection between the two areas. The relationship here is
in the nature of analogy, rather than identity in all particulars. Still, it
is not surprising that the lower court decisions on class waivers should
look to matters of function and real-world operation, not to the for189

Rent-A-Center W., Inc., v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010).

190 See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 441-42 (Cal. 1963). The
exculpatory character of the waiver deemed unconscionable in Tunkl existed independently of the possibility that a regulatory agency might undertake some manner of
public enforcement action against the hospital in the event of negligence. Contentions that a given arbitration clause is tantamount to such an exculpatory clause like-

wise are appropriately evaluated without regard to the possibility of public
enforcement. See Nagareda, supra note 43, at 1903-04. What matters is the exculpatory character of the contract vis-;I-vis private claiming.
191 For a forceful argument that the "equal footing" perspective dictated for the
§ 2 caveat goes further-to disable state unconscionability doctrine from casting as
general contract defenses what are, in practical operation, misgivings peculiar only to
some narrow subset of contracts that includes those for arbitration-see Christopher
R. Drahozal, FederalArbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 408-11 (2004). As the
next subpart shall elaborate, my argument here does not require the Court to come

definitively to rest on the outer reaches of the § 2 caveat. Under any plausible conception of the "equal footing" perspective, the inability of a court to deem unconscionable a class waiver in an ordinary contract should disable the court from doing
so with respect to an arbitration contract. Concepcion does not require engagement of
the more difficult questions surrounding when an ostensibly general contract defense
really is not general.

192

See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text (discussing Hanna and Erie).
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mality that the waiver appears within an arbitration clause. Cases
under the caveat of FAA § 2 exhibit an important structural similarity
to situations that present bona fide Erie questions.
Faced with a choice between state law and judicial creation of
federal common law, the Erie doctrine dictates that "state law must
govern because there can be no other law."'193 Under Erie, the "touch-

stone" consists of an inquiry not into the formal question of whether
the federal judge-made rule is "technically one of substance or procedure" but, rather, into the functional question of whether the choice
between that rule and state law "'significantly affect[s] the result of a
litigation.' "194
The important structural similarity is this: the unconscionability
argument against class waivers likewise presents a situation in which
state law is in play and the provenance of the would-be competing
body of federal law is in doubt. That body of federal law consists of
FAA § 2, with its command qualified by the state law caveat that limits
the delegation of authority under the FAA for private parties to reallocate civil claims to arbitration. 19 5 When the caveat of § 2 is properly
triggered, the federal law command of § 2 is turned off. As a result,
state unconscionability law governs, because "there is no other law"that is, no competing FAA command to validate the class waiver. The
functionalism of the unconscionability argument flows from the
notion that enforcement of the class waiver would affect "the result of
a litigation" as "significantly" as one could imagine: by replacing the
196
possibility of class-wide claiming with outright exculpation.
Though decided before the current debate over class waivers and not
with reference to the § 2 caveat specifically, the doctrinal yardstick
that the Court described in Green Tree actually captures the point surprisingly well by asking whether arbitration would involve "prohibitively expensive . .. costs.197
By contrast, the Hanna-like character observed in most of the
Court's FAA decisions to date stems from the recognition that the § 2
caveat was not in play there. Rather, when there is an arbitration
agreement that would encompass a given statutory claim and there is
193 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1447-48 (2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 460,
472-73 (1965)).
194 Id. at 1442 (alteration in original) (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99, 109 (1945)).

195 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text
(discussing § 2 and arguments against class waiver in the state law context).
196 Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion).
197 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000).
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no allegation of unconscionability under state law, resolution of the
arbitrability question presents a matter of statutory interpretation-of
reconciling the right of action conferred by the relevant statute with
the equally statutory command of FAA § 2 to make valid and enforceable the arbitration agreement.1 98 The inclination of the Court to say
that the arbitration clause governs here is the analogue to the formalism of Hanna,which dictates that the Federal Rules govern the matters to which they speak, even if those Rules incidentally "affect[ I] a
litigant's substantive rights" in practical terms. 199
The condition of the Court's FAA jurisprudence today, one
might say, is roughly the opposite of the Court's Erie jurisprudence
prior to Hanna. The upshot of Hannawas to cabin the potential overbreadth of application accorded to the Erie doctrine by the Court's
pre-Hanna decisions. When a Federal Rule applies, Hanna replaces
the functional inquiry into outcome determinativeness with a formal,
categorical one.20 0 The lower court decisions on class waivers effectively seek to cabin what otherwise would be an overbreadth of application as well, just one arising from the Court's Hanna-like approach
in the bulk of its FAA decisions to date. Just as Hanna circumscribes
the Erie doctrine when a Federal Rule applies, so too-converselyshould an FAA version of the Erie doctrine now circumscribe the
breadth of the Court's previous, Hanna-like approach to that statute.
When there is a viable market for claiming-either because the
case arises in the context of an individual claim whose filing evidences
its viability in itself or because the existence of such a market is otherwise not at issue (or is conceded)-a formal, Hanna-like analysis
applies. But when the existence of a market for claiming is the crux of
the dispute because the state law caveat of FAA § 2 is at issue, then a
functional, Eie-type analysis should govern. The question becomes
whether the arbitration clause stands to "significantly affect the result
20 1
of a litigation" in the sense of operating as an exculpatory clause.
In Shady Grove, the Supreme Court corrected the lower courts'
misapprehension that New York section 901(b) presented an Erie
question rather than a Hannaquestion in the presence of Rule 23.202
So, conversely, should the Court itself shift from a Hanna-type analysis
to one more akin to Erie when analyzing the exculpation question as
to class waivers under the FAA?
198 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
199 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion).
200 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing the "categorical quality" found in Hanna's approach).
201 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
202 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437; id. at 1442-43 (plurality opinion).
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Concepcion and Beyond

The usual question about class waivers concerns their proximity
to exculpatory clauses in contracts without the arbitration veneer. But
recognition of that point does not mean that all third-generation arbitration clauses present such a question. The proper line between the
Erie and Hanna doctrines can be tricky to discern within their own
sphere, as Shady Grove demonstrates. So, too, does the line between
their counterparts under the FAA warrant careful attention.
As this subpart explains, the particular third-generation clause
before the Court in Concepcion calls for exactly such discernment.
This section initially situates the question presented by Concepcion
within the framework for FAA analysis from the preceding subpart.
Shady Grove recategorized as a Hanna question what the lower courts
have mistakenly regarded as one under Erie. Concepcion presents the
converse misstep in FAA analysis: the mischaracterization as a question under the FAA counterpart to Erie what is-on the lower courts'
own premises-a question under the counterpart to Hanna. This
account thus reveals the significance of Shady Grove-much more than
Stolt-Nielsen-for the proper disposition of Concepcion. This subpart
then explains how exposition of the connection between Concepcion
and Shady Grove nonetheless leaves ample room for a functional, Erielike analysis of other class waivers in arbitration clauses.
1. Exculpation or Optimal Deterrence
As noted earlier, third-generation arbitration clauses go beyond
20 3
the inclusion of class waivers that define second-generation clauses.
203 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. Third-generation clauses are not all
alike. Some couple class waivers with features that lend more of a volitional feel to
the agreement to arbitrate-say, by calling for consumers to opt into the agreement,
along with its class waiver, in exchange for a discount or other benefits with respect to
the product or service placed under contract. See Lampley, supra note 162, at 510-12
(discussing examples of similar opt-out provisions). Approaches along these lines
misapprehend the misgivings about second-generation arbitration clauses, however.
For all the attention that the adhesive character of class waivers has garnered,
particularly in consumer contracts, that adhesive quality is not the nub of the controversy. Adhesive contracts are not invalid per se. See DiscoverBank v. Superior Court, 113
P.3d 1100, 1108, 1110 (Cal. 2005) ("We do not hold that all class action waivers are
necessarily unconscionable."). In the parlance of unconscionability doctrine in contract law, the main focus of the argument against class waivers is not that they arise via
an adhesive process-a point hardly disputed-but, rather, that they are invalid in
their substance due to their operational equivalence to exculpatory clauses. See id. at
1107-10 (discussing the exculpatory nature of class action waivers). Only by focusing

on the exculpation point-not simply by introducing a volitional dimension to the
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With an apparent nod to the kinds of cost-related concerns that the
Court discussed in Green Tree, the particular third-generation clause in
Concepcion categorically provides that AT&T Mobility ("ATTM") shall
bear "'all . . .filing, administration and arbitrator fees,"' absent a
determination by the arbitrator that the claim "'is frivolous or brought
for an improper purpose (as measured by ... Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 (b)).' -204 The controversy in Concepcion centers not on
the treatment of arbitration costs as such but, rather, on a bonus provision triggered in the event of an arbitration award to the claimant
"greater than" ATTM's last pre-arbitration settlement offer. 20 5 This
contingent bonus consists of a minimum of $7,500 for the claimant
and, for her attorney-if any-double the amount of attorneys' fees,
plus reimbursement of "any expenses . . . reasonably accrue[d] for

20 6
investigating, preparing, and pursuing" the claim in arbitration.
Though unprecedented in arbitration insofar as I am aware, the
ATTM bonus provision combines attributes of mechanisms already
familiar in litigation. As Part I observed, regimes for statutory damages typically couple small-stakes damages on an individual basis with
fee-shifting provisions. 20 7 Fee-shifting by statute remains contingent
on the plaintiff "prevailing" in the sense of "be[ing] awarded some
relief by the court,"20 8 rather than on improving upon the last settlement offer. Statutory fee shifting, however, does not encompass
expenses for expert witnesses,209 unlike the ATTM bonus provision.

contracting process-do third-generation clauses stand to address the crux of concern about their second-generation forebearers.
204 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at
*2 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008) (quoting arbitration clause). The version of the
ATTM arbitration clause at issue in Concepcion stands as a unilateral modification of
the clause in the Concepcions' original cellular phone service agreement, which contained no bonus provision. See id. at *2-3.
For criticism of unilateral modifications to consumer contracts in the arbitration
setting, see Horton, supra note 39, at 645-60.
205 See T-Mobile USA, 2008 WL 5216255, at *2 (quoting arbitration clause).
206 Id. (quoting arbitration clause). The reference to "expenses" in the ATTM
bonus provision extends to "expert witness fees and costs." See Wireless CustomerAgreement, AT&T, § 2.2(4), http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/legal/service-

agreement.jsp?q termsKey=postpaidServiceAgreement&q-termsName=Service+
Agreement (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (making explicit the treatment of "expenses"
under bonus provision).
207 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
208 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001).
209 See supra note 52 (citing, as an example, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3) (2006),
which does not explicitly grant expenses for expert witnesses).
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The crafting of the contingency under the ATTM bonus provision in terms of whether the claimant fares better than under the last
settlement offer, likewise, sounds a familiar note. On this score, the
bonus provision operates as a more claimant-friendly version of Rule
68.210 Under that rule and state law counterparts for litigation, a
defendant may make an offer of judgment during the run-up to
trial. 211 In the event that the plaintiff declines the offer and does not
fare better at trial, Rule 68 requires the plaintiff to pay the defendant's post-offer court costs. 2 12 Rather than impose a light contingent

tax on the claimant for not improving on a pre-arbitration settlement
offer, the ATTM bonus provision provides a subsidy for achievement
of such an improvement.
The claim on the merits in Concepcion consists of a garden-variety
allegation of deceptive trade practices under applicable state lawspecifically, the charging of "sales tax on the full retail value of cellular
' 2 13
phones that were advertised as 'free' or at substantial discounts.
The nature of the claim notably is such as to be inferable based on
scrutiny of the cell phone bill, not necessarily based only on the kind
of expert-intensive analysis typical of, say, complex antitrust claims for
consumer overcharges. The disputed sales tax amounts to roughly
thirty dollars for the Concepcions, 214 who did not sue individually but,
instead, initiated the usual sequence of moves 2 15 in disputes over class
2 16
waivers by filing a class action complaint in federal district court.
The jurisdictional basis for the federal forum consists of the expan210 FED. R. Cry. P. 68.
211 See id. R. 68(a) ("At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending
against a claim may serve an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified
terms .... ."); see also Albert Yoon & Tom Baker, Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East, 59 VAND. L. REV.
155, 157 (2006) (noting that most states have offer-of-judgment rules modeled on
Rule 68).
212 See FED. R. Civ. P. 68(d). If anything, the usual criticism of Rule 68 is that the
tax for not improving on the settlement offer is too low. SeeYoon & Baker, supra note
211, at 158 (2006) ("The cost-shifting mechanism of Rule 68 and the state rules
modeled thereafter are usually limited to post-offer court costs (e.g., docket and
printing fees), which, in most cases, are trivial, thereby diminishing the rules'
potency." (footnote omitted)).
213 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at
*1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008). California substantive law governs the merits based on
the Concepcions' entry into a cellular phone service contract with a corporate predecessor of ATTM in that state. See id.
214 Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted
sub nom.AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S.Ct. 3322 (2010).
215 See supra note 174 (discussing typical challenges to class action waivers).
216 T-Mobile USA, 2008 WL 5216255, at *1.
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sion in federal diversity jurisdiction afforded by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 2 17 the significance of which shall emerge
momentarily.
AT-IM predictably responded to the filing of the class complaint
with a motion to compel arbitration under the terms of its arbitration
clause.21 8 The ATTM arbitration clause includes a severability provision, whereby any invalidation of the class waiver would take with it
the underlying obligation to arbitrate.2 1 9 As a result, the dispute over
the validity of the class waiver in Concepcion effectively frames the possible outcomes in terms of either a class action (as if no arbitration
agreement existed at all) or bilateral arbitration (under the terms of
the ATTM clause).
The analysis of the lower courts in Concepcion bears close attention, for it implicates the line between a Hanna-type analysis under
the command of FAA § 2 and an Erie4ike analysis under the caveat of
that section. The claimants in Concepcion contended that the bonus
provision in the ATTM arbitration clause is "illusory," because "ATTM
will simply pay its customers' demand in full rather than incur costs of
arbitration . . . as well as Premium-based damages ($7,500) and
double attorney's fees." 22 0 The irony of this argument, for the district

court, lies in claimants' "acknowledge[ment] that the [bonus] provision prompts ATTM to accept liability, rather than 'escape liability,' for
small dollar claims ...(even for claims of questionable merit and for
claims it does not owe)."221 As the district court further noted,
"ATTM has an incentive to include reasonable attorney's fees in its
2 22
settlement offers."
For the district court, the fatal defect of the class waiver lies not in
the exculpatory character of the bonus provision but, rather, in the
disabling of the Concepcions' desired class action as a vehicle for what
commentators describe as "optimal deterrence" 223-that is, confrontation of the defendant with the full aggregate scope of its alleged mis217 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006) (providing for federal diversity jurisdiction
over proposed class actions involving state law claims based on minimal diversity of
citizenship and more than $5 million in controversy).

218 See T-Mobile USA, 2008 WL -5216255, at *1.
219 See Wireless Customer Agreement, supra note 206, § 2.2(6) ("If [class waiver] is
found to be unenforceable, then the entirety of this arbitration provision shall be null
and void.").
220 T-Mobile USA, 2008 WL 5216255, at *10.
221 Id. at*11.
222 Id. at *10 n.7.
223 See David Rosenberg, Response, Mandatoly-Litigation Class Action: The Only
Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARv. L. REV. 831, 843 (2002).
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deeds. 224 Crediting claimants' argument, the district court observed
that "prohibiting class litigation and requiring individual actions
would leave many consumers 'like the class members Plaintiffs
represent with no recovery at all for violations of their rights, even if
there would be attorneys willing to take their cases.' "225 For this point, the
district court relied heavily on an influential 2005 California Supreme
Court decision-Discover Bank v. Superior Court2 26-that deemed
unconscionable a second-generation arbitration clause with a class
waiver alone, based on identification of a California state policy "favoring" class treatment in both litigation and arbitration in order "to
deter alleged fraudulent conduct in cases involving large numbers of
consumers with small amounts of damages.

22 7

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit readily affirmed, again underscoring the California policy in favor of class treatment as a deterrence
vehicle, per Discover Bank, and pinpointing the unconscionability of
the class waiver in those terms. 228 As the Ninth Circuit observed,
"[t] he [bonus] provision does essentially guarantee that the company
will make any aggrieved customer whole who files a claim. Although
this is, in and of itself, a good thing, the problem with it under Califor229
nia law ... is that not every aggrieved customer will file a claim."
In short, Concepcion asks whether the ATTM arbitration clause is
unconscionable not because it exculpates but, instead, because it disables an individual claimant from seeking to represent the universe of
other, similarly situated persons. On the lower courts' account, it is
the distinctiveness of the class mechanism under California law as a
vehicle for representative litigation-its operation as something different from the joinder of claims already on file-that the arbitration
clause disables. As I now explain, the key to proper disposition of
224 T-Mobile USA, 2008 WL 5216255, at *12-14 (discussing deterrent value of
allowing class actions).
225 Id. at *12 (emphasis added) (quoting Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points &
Authorities in Opposition to Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration by Defendant
AT&T Mobility LLC at 21, T-Mobile USA, 2008 WL 5216255 (No. 06CV0675 DMS
(NLS))).

226
227

113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
T-Mobile USA, 2008 WL 5216255, at *14-15 (citing Discover Bank, 113 P.3d

1100).
228 See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2009). The
Ninth Circuit drew on one of its own precedents that had relied on Discover Bank to
hold unconscionable a second-generation predecessor of the third-generation AT-M
arbitration clause at issue in Concepcion. See Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs.,
Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding class arbitration waiver unconsciona-

ble under Discover Bank test).
229

AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d at 856 n.9 (emphasis added).
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Concepcion lies in the account of the relationship between Rule 23 and
state law views of class treatment found in none other than Shady
Grove.
2.

Shady Grove Redux

The lower courts in Concepcion lacked the benefit of the Supreme
Court's guidance in Shady Grove. Viewed in doctrinal hindsight, nonetheless, the lower courts' analysis in Concepcion replays the move overturned in Shady Grove.
The nature of the class action mechanism is not "a brooding
omnipresence in the sky" unconnected to some particular body of law;
it flows, instead, from "the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasisovereign that can be identified." 23 0 And identification here is not
difficult. There is no dispute that Rule 23 governs the proposed Concepcion class action in federal court. As a result, it is the opportunity to
bring a class action under the parametercs of Rule 23-not under California class action law-that the class waiver would disable, if deemed
23 1
enforceable under the FAA.

The lower courts in Concepcion attribute to the class mechanism
the force of a state law policy favoring the kind of optimal deterrence
achievable only because that mechanism does something different in
kind from joinder. The class mechanism effectively brings into the
dispute claims that are not already on file and, indeed, may well never
be filed individually. Yet the trait that supplies the critical source of
unconscionability for the lower courts in Concepcion-the nature of
the class mechanism as something different in kind from joinder-is
precisely what may not be attributed to Rule 23 after Shady Grove, at
least not without shedding considerable doubt upon the legitimacy of
that rule under the Rules Enabling Act. For all their quibbles with
each other, the Shady Grove plurality opinion and the Stevens concurrence coalesce on the firm conviction that the Rule 23 class action is
not different in kind from a whole host of other Federal Rules that
may affect claiming. 232
True enough, the caveat in FAA § 2 affords latitude for generally
applicable contract defenses in state law. 23 3 But the § 2 caveat does so
230 Cf S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(describing the common law).
231 Again, recall that the choice in Concepcion lies between a class action and bilateral arbitration. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
233 The § 2 caveat preserves generally applicable contractual defenses in state law
rather than preempting them entirely, but that preservation carries with it adherence

to an equal-footing perspective. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). If the state deviates from

2011]

LITIGATION-ARBITRATION

DICHOTOMY

1121

only on an equal-footing basis, 23 4 such that a class waiver in an arbitration agreement is, at the very least, no worse off than a class waiver
with regard to litigation contained in a contract with no mention of
arbitration. 235 In the case of a class waiver in a contract without an
arbitration clause, there would be no hook for the importation into a
federal court action of state law views concerning the class action
mechanism, for the caveat of FAA § 2 would not be in play. If a state
law policy againstthe confronting of a defendant with the full force of
class-wide deterrence beyond the plaintiff's individual claim (recall
New York section 901 (b)) cannot govern in a federal court class
action controlled by Rule 23, then a state law policy running the opposite way-a state policy in favor of a deterrent punch beyond that of
mere joinder (per the California Supreme Court's opinion in Discover
Bank)-likewise cannot govern such an action.
A state law policy concerning the confrontation of the defendant
with the full force of class-wide deterrence-whether thumbs up or
thumbs down in its policy inclination-cannot control in federal
court, even if the claims on the merits sound in state law. Rather,
Rule 23-and only Rule 23, per Shady Grove--governs a proposed class
action in the federal system. That was the error rightly corrected in
Shady Grove itself, outside of arbitration. The equal-footing perspective of the caveat in FAA § 2 compels the same result in arbitration. If
Shady Grove is right about the nature of Rule 23, then the lower courts
in Concepcion must be wrong. More broadly, the Court may use Concepcion as the vehicle for greater doctrinal integration of the litigation
and arbitration realms, in keeping with the synthetic perspective
urged here.
States remain free within their own court systems to regard the
class action mechanism in a manner different from Rule 23-as somethat perspective, then the situation is governed by the command of § 2, because the
caveat therein does not apply. See id.
For a game theoretic explanation of why judges may tend to overreach in unconscionability analysis under the § 2 caveat, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: StrategicJudgingand the Evolution of FederalArbitrationLaw, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1420, 1422 (2008), which states, "[I]t is extremely difficult for a reviewing court to tell
if a decision invalidating an arbitration agreement on unconscionability grounds
obeys [the equal-footing] rule. This difficulty creates opportunities for lower courts

to misapply, or perhaps even manipulate, state contract doctrines so as to nullify arbitration agreements while simultaneously frustrating the ability of reviewing courts to
reverse."
234 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
235 As previously noted, the setting of Concepcion does not require the Court to
engage the larger questions surrounding when an ostensibly general contract defense
is not general. See supra note 191.
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thing more like a component of available remedies in substantive law,
rather than as a procedural mechanism whose effect on substantive
rights remains incidental. The California class action rule applicable
in Discover Bank itself, for example, takes the form of duly enacted
state legislation, 236 not a rule promulgated under strictures of the
Rules Enabling Act. But what courts may not do under the rubric of
state law unconscionability doctrine is to attribute to Rule 23 a character that would invalidate-or, at least, shed considerable doubt onthat rule itself. Although state law has latitude to craft its own view of
unconscionability, that latitude stops when it comes to opining on
something that is not a matter of state law to define-just as New York
section 901 (b) could not redefine the conditions under which a class
23 7
action "may be maintained" in federal court.
The kinship between Shady Grove and Concepcion should come as
little surprise, once it is revealed. The lower courts in Concepcion effectively sought to treat the case as one under the caveat of FAA § 2, even
in the face of their own recognition that the ATTM arbitration clause
does not exculpate but, instead, simply bars the claimant at hand from
seeking to represent the universe of similarly situated persons. 23 8 As
such, on the lower courts' own premise, the appropriate framework is
the categorical, Hanna-like one under the command of § 2, not its
caveat. And that mode of analysis, in turn, brings into play the conception of Rule 23 under the Hanna doctrine, as understood in Shady
Grove, which state law may not displace with respect to a federal diversity case.

One cannot help but remark on the sense of irony here. What
was sauce for the plaintiff geese in Shady Grove is now sauce for the
defendant gander in Concepcion.239 What enabled the Shady Grove
plaintiffs "to attempt to transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000
award" 24 0-the nature of Rule 23-is, at bottom, what means that the
thirty dollar claim in Concepcion may not transform into the multimil236 See CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 2004).
237 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) ("Rule 23 provides a one-size-fits-all formula for deciding
the class-action question. Because § 901 (b) attempts to answer the same question...
it cannot apply in diversity suits unless Rule 23 is ultra vires.").
238 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
239 The involvement of the same organization as counsel of record for the wouldbe plaintiff class before the Supreme Court in both Shady Grove and Concepcion accentuates the sense of irony. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1435-36; Respondents' Brief in
Opposition, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (No. 09-893).
240 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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lion dollar stakes of the proposed class action based on the faux
unconscionability analysis of the lower courts.
The role of CAFA in all this bears note. The upshot of the jurisdictional change made by CAFA is, by now, familiar: to get high-stakes
proposed class actions involving state law claims of nationwide (or, at
least, broadly interstate) scope into the federal system, rather than to
allow them to remain in a state court likely chosen for an anomalous
inclination to grant class certification. 24 ' The odd consequence of
CAFA in Shady Grove is to "make federal courts a mecca" for state law
claims "that would be barred from class treatment in the State's own
courts." 2 42 When combined with Shady Grove in the arbitration con-

text, however, CAFA has a different effect, more in keeping with its
proponents' desire for greater federal law influence over class
treatment.
As a practical matter today, the kinds of proposed class actions
likely to elicit defense motions to compel one-on-one arbitration will
stand to be filed in (or quickly removed to) federal court. CAFA
drives this jurisdictional result for state law claims, 2 43 and the longstanding existence of federal question jurisdiction does the same for
federal law claims. 24 4 Either way, Rule 23, as understood in Shady
Grove, governs the function and force that the court may attribute to
the class mechanism under the rubric of state unconscionability doctrine, for it is Rule 23 treatment that the class waiver in such a case
would waive. The occasions for state courts to opine on waivers vis-avis counterpart state class action rules-a la Discover Bank and contemporaneous state decisions in actions filed pre-CAFA-are apt to
2 45
become much rarer post-CAFA.
241 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack,
156 U. PA. L. REv. 1649, 1664-66 (2008) (framing the main thrust of CAFA in terms
of disabling the anomalous certifying state court).
242 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
243 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST CLAss ACTIONs HANDBOOK 19

(2010) (noting a "study by the Federal Judicial Center found a 72 percent increase in
class action activity after CAFA).
244 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
245 The class action for state law claims in Discover Bank was filed in 2001, for
example, well before the effective date of CAFA. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (applying
CAFA to actions filed after February 18, 2005); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113
P.3d 1100, 1104 (Cal. 2005). In fact, all state supreme court decisions that invalidate

class waivers of which I am aware predate CAFA.
By its terms, CAFA does leave some modest room for class actions involving state
law claims to remain in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (providing both
mandatory and discretionary carve-outs from federal diversity jurisdiction for class
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After Concepcion in the Courts and Congress

At the same time, an understanding of Concepcion as a version of
Shady Grove redux contains its own significant points of self-limitation.
A decision regarding the particular third-generation arbitration clause
in Concepcion along the lines sketched here would not operate as anything like an undifferentiated green light for class waivers-much less,
in their more common, second-generation form. The critical feature
of Concepcion consists of the lower courts' odd framing of the unconscionability problem: not in terms of equivalence to an exculpatory
clause but, instead, by reference to optimal deterrence, predicated on
the existence of a fundamental difference between class actions under
Rule 23 and other procedural rules that may influence claiming. It is
the latter difference-said to comprise a difference in kind-that
leads the reasoning of the lower courts in Concepcion to run headlong
into the holding in Shady Grove.
By contrast, when the question of unconscionability concerns the
operation of the class action not to enable additional claiming on
behalf of others but, instead, to avoid exculpation of the defendant
entirely, Shady Grove fades in significance. On the exculpation question, the proper analytical framework for a class waiver is that which
would govern a waiver of any other aspect of civil litigation, whether in
an ordinary contract or one for arbitration. Equivalence in the analytical framework for class waivers and waivers of any other attribute of
civil litigation is consonant with the view of Rule 23 in Shady Grove,
unlike the lower courts' approach in Concepcion. In short, one is back
to the framework for contentions that an arbitration clause of any
sort-with class waivers or without, or with a waiver of something
else-is tantamount to an exculpatory clause: the burden-allocation
framework of Green Tree.
The question under Green Tree is whether the difference between
litigation and arbitration at hand makes the latter forum cost "prohibitive"-a term that, again, targets the inquiry on the exculpation question.

246

A given arbitration clause with a class waiver may flunk this

criterion, but waivers of other matters might not. The law can, in
other words, distinguish waivers of things that make a decisive funcactions of a more localized character). In addition, insofar as federal courts like the
Ninth Circuit have (mistakenly) brought to bear state law conceptions of class treatment in cases governed by Rule 23, the choice between determination of the unconscionability question in California state court, rather than in a federal court sitting in
that state, might be seen as so inconsequential as to discourage removal by defendants, even in a case to which CAFA applies.
246 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000).
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tional difference from waivers of specifications about trivial matters,
such as the required color of briefs. In this sense, the functionalism of
Green Tree partakes of the functionalism found in the Erie doctrine,
albeit with more weight afforded to arbitration under the general
command of FAA § 2 than Erie affords to federal common law.
Comparison of Concepcion to a prominent case involving a second-generation arbitration clause lends specificity to the preceding
discussion. Shortly after deciding Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court
granted the writ of certiorari in In re American Express Merchants Litigation ("Amex Merchants") ,247 only to vacate the judgment and remand
for reconsideration by the Second Circuit. 248 Amex Merchantsinvolved
an alleged unlawful tying arrangement under the Sherman Act-antitrust claims that, as a practical matter, entail the incurring of expert
expenses "from about $300 thousand to more than $2 million" for
sophisticated economic analysis, 249 unlike the read-the-bill kind of
claim on the merits in Concepcion. The evidence from class counsel on
the whopping magnitude of expert expenses needed in Amex
Merchants stood unopposed in the record by any defense-side
analysis.

2 50

Writing prior to Stolt-Nielsen, the Second Circuit had deemed
unconscionable the unadorned class waiver in Amex Merchants due to
the prohibitive fixed costs associated with the preparation of even a
single claim. 251 Although it remains to be seen what the Second Circuit will say on remand, the analysis sketched here points the way.
Credible, unopposed evidence that a class waiver will operate as an
exculpatory clause with regard to the particular kinds of claims at
issue discharges the burden placed by Green Tree on the opponent of
arbitration "of showing the likelihood of' incurring "prohibitive"
252

costs.

247

554 F.3d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded sub nom.

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010).
248 Id.
249 Id. at 316 (quoting expert affidavit of Dr. Gary L. French, economist).
250 See id. at 318-19.
251 See id.
252 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000). A further twist
in Amex Merchants stems from the observation that Congress considered and rejected
a proposal to include in the original Sherman Act what would have amounted to an
opt-in mechanism for the aggregation of private claims. See Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 24-27 (1989). Were the proper analysis
in Amex Merchants a formal, categorical one directed to whether the modem Rule 23
class action is a matter of "procedure" or "substance," this feature in the original Sherman Act would have significance. In a case properly under the caveat of FAA § 2,
however, a categorical, Hanna-type analysis is inapplicable, and the more functional,
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In short, the treatment urged here for Concepcion still leaves
ample room for nuanced, circumstantial analysis of other class waivers. Nuance is desirable not just to lend needed precision to the
Court's FAA jurisprudence. From a broader institutional standpoint,
nuance from the Court with respect to class waivers holds the promise
of forestalling much more blunderbuss moves in Congress. The FAA
language of greatest concern today dates from 1925, before economic
globalism as we now know it. Over time, moreover, the kind of "legal
no-man's-land" 253 that animated the Court's steady embrace of arbitration from the 1970s forward is likely to diminish. It comes as no
surprise, then, that the notion of amending the FAA should surface in
a changed world.
The many policy questions presented by the proposed Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009254 lie beyond the scope of this Article to treat in

depth. Still, even a casual observer cannot help but remark on how
the undifferentiated exclusion from the FAA contemplated under the
proposed legislation for wide swaths of arbitration clauses-those in
consumer, employment, and franchise contracts and with respect to
civil rights255 -partakes of the same kind of undifferentiated
approach that its proponents see in the Supreme Court's FAA case
law.256 The lack of nuance and differentiation just runs in the opposite direction. The tenor of debate has heightened to such a degree
the
that the legal press has gone so far as to warn that Congress and2 57
Court "appear headed for collision over mandatory arbitration."
The approach offered in this Article holds the promise of turning
a potential collision into an opportunity for dialogue. The relationship between litigation and arbitration is not one susceptible to a unitary solution. Allocation of all civil claims to the private realm of
arbitration, with a kind of willful blindness to its real-world operation,
is unwarranted. 2 58 Amidst worldwide economic retrenchment,
Erie-style analysis dictates attention to the real-world impact of the arbitration clause,
apart from formal categories. See supra Part III.A. On the latter view, the absence of a
class action-like mechanism in the original Sherman Act is not determinative when
the arbitration clause would operate to waive such a mechanism in current law-if not
part of the Sherman Act itself, even today.
253 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974).
254 H.R. 1020, 111th Cong.
255 Id. § 4 (proposed exclusion of the specified types of disputes from the command of FAA § 2).
256 Marcia Coyle, Colliding on Arbitration, NAT'L LJ.,June 14, 2010, at 1, 1-3 (not-

ing the "pro-arbitration" stance of the Court across various types of contracts).
257 Id. at 1.
258 For a statement of this view with respect to class waivers specifically, see Myriam
Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class
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unquestioned faith in the operation of the private marketplace in
arbitration is wildly out of kilter with reality.2 5 9 But, so, too, is an

equally undifferentiated sense of nostalgia, 2 60 predicated on the
notion that the only way to do justice in civil law is via litigation along
peculiarly American lines.
Like nostalgia in other forms, nostalgia about U.S.-style litigation
stems from a valuable awareness of what is genuinely good about past.
The litigation legacy of Brown v. Board of Education26 1-a class action,
it bears note2 62-continues to loom large over the twenty-first century.
Undifferentiated nostalgia about litigation, nonetheless, is out of line
with what stands as arguably the signature development in the U.S.
civil justice landscape since Brown: the emergence of private dispute
2 63
resolution as a vibrant institutional alternative to litigation in court.
Undifferentiated nostalgia is equally out of line with the emergence of serious interest in other Western industrialized societiesthose that we would not regard as unconscionable-in the development of processes for the mass handling of civil claims, just not necessarily processes along the lines of the U.S.-style class action. 2 64 As the
Supreme Court recognized as early as 1972, " [w]e cannot have trade
Action, 104 MICH. L. REv. 373, 375, 378 (2005), arguing that class actions "will soon be
virtually extinct," and that class actions "do far more good than harm."
259 On this view, a more textured account of private ordering in arbitration is of a
piece with a larger rethinking of the role of the marketplace in the Supreme Court's
public-law jurisprudence. See Noah Feldman, Imagining a Liberal Court, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., June 27, 2010, at 38.
260 For similar use of the term "social nostalgia" to describe how rosy visions of
governing arrangements from the Middle Ages have affected the design of modem
administrative government, see EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT 1-6 (2007).
261

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

262 Id. at 495. On the deep influence of Brown on the current civil justice system,
see Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1975 (2004).
263 One may see the emergence of ADR as a civil justice version of the more general move toward privatization. See generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT (Jody Freeman
& Martha Minow eds., 2009).
264 On the efforts in Europe to develop a distinctively European approach for
aggregate litigation, see Coffee, supra note 149, at 302, emphasizing the European
inclination to rely on consumer and other standing organizations rather than
entrepreneurial class counsel on the U.S. model; Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REv. 179, 180-81 (2009),
questioning the ability of Europe ultimately to avoid entrepreneurial litigation; and
Nagareda, supra note 149, at 28, noting European inclination to provide for more
efficient handling of claims already in the civil justice system without enabling claiming en masse.
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and commerce in world markets . . . exclusively on our terms, gov2 65
erned by our laws, and resolved in our courts."
If the ethos of the 1938 revamping of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was to bring more claims into the litigation system, then

the challenge for today lies in what to do with them. 266 And, on that

score, an undifferentiated ban on arbitration in major subject areas
would only heighten the challenge for the law to address. The emergence of nuance in Supreme Court doctrine for the FAA holds the
promise of highlighting the need for similarly nuanced-not blunderbuss-management of the relationship between litigation and arbitration. On that score, there remains a pressing need for dialogue across
regimes too often conceived as dichotomous.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's divergent accounts of class treatment in litigation and arbitration across its 2010 decisions in Shady Grove and
Stolt-Nielsen invite explanation. In the face of conventional accounts
of litigation and arbitration as dichotomous regimes for the resolution
of civil claims, this Article has urged a more synthetic perspective.
Juxtaposition of Shady Grove and Stolt-Nielsen serves to highlight deep
structural similarities between the Court's treatment of federal and
state authority in litigation and the Court's now-extensive jurisprudence on arbitration.
For diversity cases, the Erie and Hanna doctrines mediate
between federal and state authority, depending upon the presence of
a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure on point. Shady Grove extends the
Hanna framework to federal court cases governed by Rule 23. But,
understood in context, Shady Grove leaves undisturbed the notion that
contrary guidance in state law may inform the federal court's treatment of the Rule 23(b) (3) superiority requirement, even though state
law is not strictly binding on the court in the Erie sense.
For the FAA, an unrecognized line of distinction lies embedded
within the Court's decisions-one that bears a striking resemblance to
the line that Shady Grove delineates between Erie and Hanna. When
the question under FAA § 2 does not concern the prospect of exculpation for the defendant, the Court properly has taken a relatively categorical, Hanna-like view of the types of civil claims that arbitration
may encompass. This view not only reconciles the existence of publiclaw claims in federal statutes with the equally statutory command to
265 Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,9 (1972).
266 SeeJudith Resnik, Compared to What?: AL! Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of
Due Process and of Lauyers'Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 628, 637-38 (2011).
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validate arbitration agreements in FAA § 2, it also-more fundamentally-makes sense of the broader international setting for contracting
in the globalized world of commerce that has emerged in the recent
decades. Only by situating arbitration in continuity with the chronology of transnational guidance for the recognition and enforcement of
judgments does the logic of the Court's FAA decisions come to the
fore. Such a transnational perspective, in particular, supplies the
needed explanation for the holding of Stolt-Nielsen to disallow the use
of class arbitration in the face of silence regarding such treatment in
an arbitration clause.
But when the question under the caveat in FAA § 2 concerns the
viability of claiming vel non-that is, the operation of an arbitration
clause tantamount to an exculpatory clause-the command to validate arbitration under § 2 is placed into doubt at the same time that
competing state law conceptions of unconscionability come into play.
Resolution of the state law constraint written into the § 2 caveat properly has elicited a more functional, Erie-like approach for the rare
occasion, thus far, in which the Court has faced such a scenario.
The Court's impending encounter with the class waiver included
as part of the arbitration clause in Concepcion calls for careful attention
to the FAA counterparts to the Erie and Hanna doctrines. Properly
understood, the critical precedent that guides the disposition of Concepcion is not Stolt-Nielsen but, rather, Shady Grove. The unconscionability attributed by the lower courts to the arbitration clause in the
federal court class action proposed in Concepcion lies not in its equivalence to an exculpatory clause but, instead, consists of a distinctive
effect of class treatment different in kind from joinder-what Shady
Grove disallows as a proper account of Rule 23. Such a disposition of
Concepcion, guided by Shady Grove, nonetheless leaves ample room for
appropriately differentiated treatment of other arbitration clauses
with class waivers said not merely to bar claiming on behalf of others
but to exculpate the defendant entirely.
Specifics of doctrine aside, the hard work for the future lies in
nuanced mediation between the public sphere of litigation and the
private one of arbitration-mediation attentive to federal-state lines of
authority in the domestic sphere and the growing globalism in all segments of contemporary life. In this enterprise, the old chestnuts of
Erie and Hanna for litigation federalism in the domestic realm-surprisingly enough-offer guidance for more nuanced approaches to
the FAA in our globalized world.
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